

Does the European Union Promote Peace?

Analysis, critique and alternatives

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Summary of this report

This one-man study contains a macro-analysis of the areas of defence, security, foreign policy, conflict management and peace in EU policy and in the Draft Constitution. It deliberately does not go into details for individual countries or specific problem areas, but looks at concepts, values and objectives in a general context.

A theory and analysis tool will be designed first and employed to analyse what is actually said and done at EU level; that will be examined using a number of explicit criteria. It will also examine what does *not* appear but could have appeared in the Draft Constitution. The analysis works on the EU's own premises in the sense that it takes seriously three key realities about the EU: that the Union's leaders perceive themselves as advocates for peace, that the Constitution cites peace as the Union's primary objective and that the EU is explicitly not only a project for peace within Europe but one that will also create a better world for all, that is to say for the 92 percent of mankind living outside the Union.

There are basically two main views about how world peace can be created. One of these states that all countries and supranational units need, first and foremost, *defence and security* based on military strength. This view accepts that a force for good exists which to a certain degree balances or eradicates the force for evil. The other maintains that what is needed is a greater understanding of conflict, more professional *conflict management and a principled problematization* of violence itself and that when we have achieved that, there will be less need for military force in the world.

These two approaches to peace will be analysed along four dimensions, namely *direct* violence, *structural* violence, *cultural* violence and *environmental* violence. The analysis, the critique and the alternatives will therefore be presented in eight main sections.

The EU is often described as a project for peace, but without making clear what is meant by the word 'peace'. This study, however, shows clearly that the Draft Constitution and the policies already adopted by the Union, and its institutions, are only an expression of peace in the first sense mentioned above, that is defence and military-dominated security. Nothing points in the direction that the EU will contribute to reducing the direct violence in the world. Indeed, the Constitution, which says nothing about disarmament, human security or dialogue, nor challenges the existence of nuclear weapons, puts Member States under a direct obligation to re-arm in the future. Moreover, there is much to suggest that increased force and militarisation of politics may also become a central part of the future EU, even though the Union possesses neither a detailed risk analysis nor a European security doctrine.

The study also shows that the EU as a peace project is not nearly so intellectually consistent or visionary as the UN Charter. It may actually be said *that the Draft Constitution can be seen as a serious step backwards in relation to the standards and values of the UN Charter.*

In the few rather non-committal references to world peace being desirable, it is not possible to find concrete targets for a general reduction of violence in Europe, or the world, nor for measured, principled and professional conflict management with the emphasis on civilian methods or general disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.

Regarding *structural* violence, this study concludes that in the draft EU Constitution - beyond references to sustainable development, development aid, humanitarian aid, trade and market mechanisms and the standard of equal opportunities for women - *there does not seem to exist a broader understanding of the extent and seriousness of the global poverty and underdevelopment problem*. No new norms are promoted, ethical or otherwise, and no major political effort is outlined, proportional to the scale of the global problems and the urgency with which they ought to be addressed.

The drafters, people in EU's leadership, seem to be *ignorant of Europe's own colonial and warlike past as seen through the eyes of others*. It doesn't seem to occur to the authors of the Constitution that the Union could have a historical responsibility for at least some of the world's needy, not least in Africa.

Although international terrorism poses a major threat to the EU, one looks in vain for any consideration of the possibility that want and the feeling of powerlessness could be one of the reasons behind the terror threat now directed at Western targets. It is therefore an extraordinarily traditional and simplistic world view that emerges from the Constitution.

Next follows an analysis of the EU's contribution to reducing *cultural violence* in the world. When one considers the extent to which Europe today faces intercultural misunderstandings, and that the Draft Constitution is being decided in a period of increasing potential for cultural conflicts, especially between parts of the Christian West and the Muslim world, *the whole treatment of other cultures and the Union's role in relation to them must be seen as outdated*- indeed as written with the missionary 'colonial mind.'

It is the more regrettable as the EU aims to contribute to world peace as a whole and not only in Europe. Without dialogue, respect for the ways in which others define basic values and without an explicit desire to learn from each other, it is difficult to see how the EU might be able to contribute to a reduction in the world's cultural violence.

Finally, there is *environmental violence*. Taken at face value, the EU Draft Constitution offers no hope of global environmental regeneration and future sustainable development. *It lacks every holistic approach to the relationship between people, production, consumption and nature*. The Constitution's built-in belief that perpetual economic growth and a market economy are automatically compatible with both a reduction in environmental violence and a solution to the problem of poverty is contradicted by extensive and impartial research, analyses of the global system's economic history and by scenarios such as, for example, the latest report by the Club of Rome.

The balance between the many pages about the function and blessings of the market and the two very modest pages about environmental aspects which, it is pointed out, do not commit Member States to any new initiatives but only express concerns, speaks for itself.

This summarizes the introduction, the approaches and Chapters 1-4 of the report. Twenty-five both major and lesser proposals follow in chapter 5-8 on what the EU could do to promote peace in the other sense, that is, through conflict management and the reduction of direct, structural, cultural and environmental violence. The proposals are by no means exhaustive and do not constitute an agenda, but are made as constructive illustrations and support for the wider popular debate that is called for.

The study concludes with a short postscript and a guide to the most important documents and websites relating to this question.

Introductory remarks

This one-man study has been produced at the initiative of the Danish think-tank *New Agenda*. It asked me to investigate what can be said from a peace research perspective about the EU in general and about the proposed EU Constitution in particular. It is in their very nature that the following pages are the expression of one person's opinion regarding both peace research and the EU. It is therefore completely natural that different analyses might have come up with other answers than those given here to the question of whether or not the EU is a new and promising partner for peace.

If this study can contribute to a wider and more structured debate on peace policy and the differences between this and a traditional defence and security policy, it will have achieved an important part of its objective. Since the French and Dutch 'No' to the Draft Constitution, it has become even more important to identify alternatives that can enter the new debate about another EU in the changing Europe and wider world system.

In the study a wider definition of peace is used than simply the absence of war or an enforced ceasefire. The traditional focus on armaments in the world - something that the mainstream security and defence thinkers on the one hand and peace movements on the other seem to have in common - is replaced by a wider approach that incorporates both the values and policies of the EU Member States, the EU institutions and the Constitution in relation to four scales: *direct* violence, *structural* violence, *cultural* violence and *environmental* violence.

The macro-perspective, including the Union's role in world society, and the broader concept of peace, is maintained not just because it is theoretically and politically important, but also because it permits the reader/user of this study to feel that it is essentially right to discuss these questions in a wider perspective in time and space.

Regardless of whether the Draft Constitution is finally approved, rejected but in practice used hereafter, or ends up in the bin, the discussion of it is by no means unimportant. A Constitution - a sort of pact between citizens and their leaders - should not just give a snapshot nor be here today and gone tomorrow. It is life philosophy, social philosophy and politics in one; it is past, present and future in one. In the draft EU Constitution we finally have a political document and a theme that can only be discussed within a framework that goes beyond the traditional four-year election frame and which is both national, regional and global. The Draft Constitution is moreover binding on over 450 million of the world's relatively most privileged people. It may only be 8 percent of mankind, but the EU represents much more than 8 percent of the world's economic, political, cultural and military power.

We shall begin with a short conceptual discussion. Some of it will perhaps seem to be 'theoretical' and therefore dull. On the one hand nothing is as practical as a good theory and, on the other, the study aims to give the reader the conditions for understanding the criticism levelled at the claim that the EU is a project for peace.

Following the theoretical discussion comes an analysis based on the four types of violence and two ways of considering peace; in other words, eight themes. This study therefore offers both analysis and criticism but also constructive alternatives in a series of both general and detailed points. And with this said, I wish you a good read and debate on the future of the EU, the rest of Europe and the world.

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Lund, 1 August 2006

The Concepts

- What peace is not but could be

Let us begin with the question, What could peace be about? - and then move on without further discussion to confront some of the theoretically and historically erroneous views about peace, perhaps even without doing them perfect justice.

In certain circumstances peace can be promoted by a certain *balance of power or weapons*, but peace is much more than such a balance, which is on the whole always measured in destructive terms: the quantity, types and technical quality of the weapons, and military expenditures. For as long as this theory has existed, the classical problem has been that the definition of such an equilibrium is completely subjective; when A thinks that there is a balance, B normally feels that A is superior, and vice versa. The historical result has been either a steady build-up of more weaponry on both (all) sides, or of more advanced technology, or both. In practice, disarmament has only taken place in areas that the parties considered to be irrelevant or obsolete.

Nor is peace the same as the *balance of terror*, which has two meanings today. The first is the old balance of terror based on nuclear weapons; NATO and the Warsaw Pact both knew that if one side fired nuclear missiles at the other, the latter, after this first strike, would have enough nuclear weapons stockpiled in its silos, on its aircraft and submarines for a retaliation strike. In other words, it meant mutually assured destruction (MAD), that is, millions of dead citizens on both sides.

This was the nuclear deterrent, the 'balance of terror' in a nutshell. The word 'terror', which governments and other elites today prefer to avoid in this connection because it places the nuclear countries in the same category as Bin Laden and other terrorists, still has the same meaning as when used about today's terrorists, namely to achieve a political objective by deliberately taking *innocent people* hostage, killing or otherwise harm them. The nuclear deterrent, however, is also relevant in connection with the EU, because a number of EU countries are members of the nuclear-based NATO alliance and because England and France possess nuclear weapons themselves.

The other type of balance of terror started on 7 October 2001 with the USA's attack on Afghanistan. Whilst the terror of 11 September was a hugely criminal act, it was not an act of war. The United States and large parts of the West chose to interpret the event as a declaration of war, it should be remembered, not only against two targets in the USA but against the entire Western civilisation. The consequences of this have since greatly influenced almost all areas of politics and social life and pass under the name of 'the war against terror', which should rightly be called the war against terrorists.

This is also relevant because the EU's general security doctrine of December 2003, written by the High Representative or 'foreign minister' Javier Solana, presents an image of threat against Europe in which terror attacks is ranked as most important, together with the risk of weapons of mass destruction proliferation.

Peace cannot in general be achieved by putting in practice the old slogan '*if you want peace, pre-*

pare for war'. One could claim, with a little musing, that in most aspects of life it would be absurd to prepare oneself for the opposite of what one wishes in order to obtain it - 'if you want love, prepare to hate' or 'if you want health, prepare to be ill'. The resources spent today on constantly preparing this *war system peace* are so comprehensive - in fact unbelievably vast - that they may be said to stand in the way of almost all initiatives that build on the opposite principle, namely 'if you want peace, prepare for peace'.

In this context it is reasonable to talk about '*opportunity costs*': what would one be able to obtain in exchange for the money (or some of it) that is allocated to the war system today?

Between 60 000 and 100 000 people, mainly women and children, die unnecessarily *every day* due to a lack of clean water, food, clothes, shelter, medicine and other absolutely basic essentials for life. This happens at the same time as we suffer from more and more problems of over-development, such as cardiovascular disease, abuse of medicines and drugs, and obesity; for example, 300 000 Americans die each year as a result of being overweight.

Nearly 190 countries worldwide spend each year as much to prepare for war as the poorest half of mankind (3 billion) has to live on. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, estimates the world's military expenditures in 2004 to be 975 billion dollars (calculated at 2003 prices) and 1 100 billion dollars in 2005 prices. That is 162 dollars for every single person on the planet or 2.6 percent of the world's GNP.

Of this, the United States alone accounts for almost half, or 47 percent. In comparison, the entire UN system annually costs somewhere between 15 and 20 billion dollars. The world's total aid to developing countries amounts to almost 79 billion dollars, according to the OECD in 2004. Whilst around half a million researchers and engineers are paid by countries exclusively for developing new, more sophisticated weapons, there are no more than 2 000 peace researchers in the world.

Many other figures could be mentioned. *Global militarisation* has continued - even if under other names such as 'peace', 'security', 'stability' and 'balance' - since the Second World War. At no time has it been placed on top of the global agenda as a problem requiring resolute action *in order to create real development, security and peace for more people on the globe*.

The question one may well pose is this: can the EU - at last - become the player in world society that will understand and practice a different sort of peace that does not demand such an incomprehensibly large use of resources and therefore does not have such correspondingly inhumane consequences? Can the Union become a force for a *new agenda*, a better balance: less militarisation and more development? Or will it, rather, pursue the nation states' traditional beliefs which by definition are narrow, in the self-centred meaning, rather than global and integral, and thereby increase its own militarisation?

Some will certainly object that even if the world should disarm, there will still be poverty and want; in other words it is not only military consumption that stands in the way of a just world. There is much truth in this. Military-dominated security thinking does, however, constitute one barrier - among others - to a more peaceful, just and democratic world for these reasons: 1)

it devours scarce resources that could be used for the benefit of humankind; 2) it consolidates the skewed socio-economic world order by being pursued by precisely those countries that already have the most economic, political and other powers; 3) it is incompatible with democracy to the extent that nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction are handled by a small and numerically shrinking elite in the nuclear powers, who have never given the population the chance, for example through votes or referenda, to decide whether or they want to be defended by deterrence or, if that fails, by nuclear war.

When peace is defined as a balance of power, a balance of terror and promoted by 'if you want peace, prepare for war', seems outdated today, it will be more so tomorrow. So what instead could peace be?

One haiku-like answer may be: peace is handling conflicts and other problems with as little violence as possible. I used another, longer and more elaborate answer in the books *To Develop Security and Secure Development* (Vindrose 1983) and *Winning Peace* (Taylor & Francis 1988) and it is implicit in almost all my other writings since then:

Peace is everything that serves to secure development and to develop security, for the whole person (physical/psychological/spiritual) and for all people, in a permanent process that takes its point of departure in a model of human and social needs, is based on an ethics of care and, overall, allows for unity in diversity.

In other words, peace is related to development and security, two profound individual and social needs. Nothing can develop without a certain sense of security that it will also exist tomorrow; security cannot be created in stagnation but demands development, something to secure and the resources with which to secure it.

Peace is then related to conflicts and violence. With development, it follows that we as individuals, societies and cultures want different things, have different projects - our freedom of choice may easily conflict with the freedom of others to choose their lives. If our existence and that of the whole world shall not become a universal struggle of all against everybody else, it is vital that we learn to pull together and conflict in the least threatening and violent ways possible.

We may therefore use the following as a medium-term approach to or description of peace:

Peace is about handling conflicts that inevitably arise when many different players seek to satisfy their needs, develop and secure/protect themselves, with the least possible violence.

Conflicts happen! What we must prevent is not conflicts - for without them life would be dull and would not develop; society would be an Orwellian '1984' in which everyone thinks the same thoughts. What a *peace policy* should seek to prevent are the different types of violence that are often found in or rather beneath situations of conflict, or are employed for so-called conflict resolution.

Let us therefore look at some *different types of violence* - based largely on the thoughts of peace researcher Johan Galtung - and thereby we are reminded of his book *The European Community: A Superpower in the Making* (Christian Ejlertsen 1972), which nearly 35 years later still has something important to say about the EU's problems.

Direct violence. One actor harms another, for example a soldier who shoots another soldier. It may be physical or psychological. It may be connected with violence in thoughts, words or deeds.

Structural violence. Here the actor is a whole system, not a person. The system is constructed in such a way that it creates a gap between the possible realisation of social potentials and the actual realization. It is direct violence when a man hits his wife. But if nearly all men hit and oppress women, it is also a systematic phenomenon built into the system (machismo, patriarchal, dominance model). We have already mentioned another example: the 60 000-100 000 people in the world who die unnecessarily every day due to lack of the most basic things in life; no individuals kill them, the system does.

Cultural violence. The conviction that one's own culture or civilization is superior to others and is better, that others - for their own sake - should accept our standards or even accept having them forced upon them. That there is a ladder of civilisation and that everyone must climb up towards us who stand on the highest rung. Other examples of cultural violence are sexism and racism, contempt for the weak - they are themselves to blame for their deprivation. Further, the view of foreigners as nothing but a burden, not a resource for or gift to ourselves. Naturally all the cultural artefacts and symbols such as flags, music, marching, uniforms, palaces and propaganda promote and legitimise direct and structural violence and hide our own actions as being the reason for them.

Environmental violence. The view that Creation around us is exclusively there to satisfy our material needs. Nature does not have a value in itself. The conversion of nature's worth into goods in a market economy, the extermination of species, pollution, faster destruction than re-growth; the view that the natural sciences are the highest or only authority and that Mother Earth must be forced to reveal all her secrets and be controlled by male scientific and rational penetration. In everyday life we recognise these violent phenomena in the special economic interests, the careless and short sighted perspective of governments and corporations on the environment and resources, and the smog over virtually every medium-sized town.

In other words, there are four main types of violence with lots of sub-types, contexts and different expressions varying from culture to culture, place to place, time to time. Direct violence - both human and natural - is the most visible and fills most of all news programmes and a lot of entertainment, the others often overlooked but no less important.

Structural violence is, on the whole, seldom discussed, although it kills many more people than war and other direct violence - all those who have died in wars since 1945 (around 30 million people) equals less than two years' harvest of victims to structural violence in our world. Cultural violence is so natural that it still only becomes an issue in the subcultures of the culturally violent society, not at its top. Environmental violence is visible to everyone, but is usually explained as the 'unfortunate' consequences of 'development' rather than as a fundamentally dual-

listic world picture brought about by humans aligned with the special commercial interests of limitless growth - altogether something that both by themselves and together prevent us from realising the plain truth that everything is interconnected.

In this study we pose the question: does the EU really address these four categories of violence and, if it does, is its Constitution indicative of a deeper understanding and need for action? To what degree is the Union's policies an expression of consciousness regarding problems on one or more of these dimensions? Does the Draft Constitution express standards, objectives and concrete policies that can persuade us that there is a good chance that the Union will make an essential contribution to reducing violence in one or more of the four areas?

If the answers for each of the four areas are 'yes' rather than 'no', one may legitimately describe the EU as a peace project. If this is only the case for certain points, then we must certainly work to make the EU better where it is falling behind. Or is it the case, perhaps, that the EU and the Constitution are so constructed - expresses such a conceptual complex and self-understanding - that one must fear that a strong EU could in reality contribute to more violence along the four dimensions in the future? The answer rather depends, again, on what we mean by peace in actual practice.

Two ways of practising peace

Military-based security versus conflict management and reduction of violence

We must make another distinction in order to carry out the analysis: between *defence and security* on the one hand and *conflict management and reduction of violence* on the other.

A. Defence and Security

The first perspective is traditional national security as we know it from the individual EU Member States. The state must protect its citizens from outside threats, be they military, economic or political. If the state is strong and safe, its citizens can feel safe. This idea operates with a defence policy, wider security policy and finally foreign policy.

Defence policy is generally based on military power, either independently or in alliance with like-minded. Security policy is broader, about positioning oneself in the larger system to increase one's own relative security. There are many instruments at play here - the military as a deterrent, foreign policy, involvement in international organisations, disarmament negotiations, aid to developing countries, involvement in UN operations and naturally imports and exports, including those of military equipment, etc. Foreign policy overlaps with both but traditionally focuses first and foremost on bilateral or multilateral relations with other countries, including the EU.

In this paradigm there is normally a hierarchy of priorities. They emerge when one asks the 'opposite' question: could we cope without a military? - and the answer is no! Could we cope without giving aid to developing countries? - we could indeed! Could we cope without having relations with or dealing with other countries? - certainly some, but it depends. Could we cope as well if we were not tightly bound to allies and those we view as friends, for example, the U.S.? - absolutely not! Despite the fact that intellectuals and also many politicians who believe in this paradigm often talk about human security, environmental security etc., at the end of the day it is the military means - either what is employed for prestige or as a threat, or what is actually used - that constitutes the primary instrument in real situations when a particularly threatening situation develops. At the core is the nation state; the task of the state is to defend itself and its people in a threatening world. Naturally, we profess to not want war but it may - unfortunately - be necessary to defend ourselves and our interests against those who threaten us.

B. Peace as reduction of violence and conflict management

According to this 'school,' a more peaceful state of affairs can only be created if security, defence and development work together with lower levels of violence. In order to be able to achieve this, we need to approach underlying conflicts in a new way. The idea here is that, by having

the greatest possible *conflict knowledge*, we can hope to find other ways of solving the problems than by threats and the use of violence.

But the EU wants to create *supra*-national structures. It is said of the EU again and again that it is an instrument for a greater peace, partly within the EU as a group, partly for a better world. And this is seen clearly in the title of the European Security Strategy by Javier Solana, *A Secure Europe in a Better World*.

We therefore need a meta-concept and a *trans*-national perspective which both go 'beneath' the nation-state and integrates the individual, and go 'above' it to include the global issues. Hence the question as to whether the EU is essentially good for itself and its own, or is also a good for the world as a whole.

As a future great power or superpower, the EU must choose which kind of peace it will pursue. Is the Union able and willing to contribute to more violence, about the same amount of violence or consistently less violence in tomorrow's world? This is the question that must be analysed before deciding whether or not the EU is a peace project.

In the first application of peace mentioned above, violence is relative. Peace, the non-violent or least violent situation, must be brought about by a strong force for Good holding down or killing a weaker force for Evil. To exercise violence is therefore not fundamentally bad, violence in itself is not the difficulty - it is rather the actor who exercises violence, who for one reason or another is bad (in the eyes of some). According to the advocates of this theory, the fundamental point is the difference between good/just/productive violence and bad/unjust/counter-productive violence. In this approach there is only a need for alternative violence, not for alternatives *to* violence, and that alternative is the force for good - exercised on behalf of the world or civilisation.

Not so in this second approach. It rests on the assumption that violence is bad in principle, even if exercising violence in rare, specific cases may be a necessary evil. The proponents of this theory say that there are alternatives *to* violence or that alternatives should be devised, rather than alternative violence. In other words, they hold that peace leads to the reduction of violence and can best be brought about through increased knowledge and understanding of conflicts and conflict-resolution mechanisms.

Guide - the relevant sections of the draft Constitution

What follows is a list of the crucially relevant titles in the Draft Constitution concerning defence, conflict management, security, foreign affairs and peace¹.

Part I

Article 2 - The Union's Values

Article 3 - The Union's Objectives

Article 16 - The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

Article 19, 24, *inter alia* - The Union's Institutions and Bodies

Article 28 - The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs

Article 40 - Specific provisions relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

Article 41 - Specific provisions relating to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

Article 43 - Solidarity clause in place for terrorist attacks, natural and man-made disasters.

Part II - Charter of Fundamental Rights

Contains statements and standards with relevance to questions concerning peace, equality, justice, universal values, etc.

Part III - The Policies and Functioning of the Union

Titles I-IV

Article 233 - Environment

Article 256 - Energy

Article 257-264 - Areas of freedom, security and justice

Article 284 - Civil protection

Title V The Union's External Action

Article 292-293 - Provisions having general application

Article 294-308 - The Common Foreign and Security Policy, CFSP

Article 309-312 - The Common Security and Defence Policy, CSDP

Article 311 - The European Defence Agency (EDA) and its tasks

Article 319-321 - Economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries and humanitarian aid

Article 329 - Implementation of the solidarity clause

Article 416-423 - Enhanced cooperation (especially Article 419 regarding the CFSP)

Article 436 - On supplying information contrary to essential interests of national security, including those concerning the production of or trade in arms, etc.

Both the Draft Constitution and the policies achieved to date at EU level regarding these the-

¹ The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe is dated December 16, 2004, and can be found on <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/12004V/htm/12004V.html>.

The main titles of the Constitution are 448 articles in total (203 pages), to which are appended 36 Protocols and 2 Annexes and 2 Declarations as the Final Act, 271 pages in total. The whole text of the Constitution is therefore 474 pages in total.

mes reflect the fact that the Union places the greatest emphasis on the security paradigm and, under this, on the military dimension. Hence the discussion of these themes in this study is relatively long. Anyone wanting to gain a complete picture should therefore read the discussion of all eight scales.

1. Security: the EU and direct violence

The European Security Strategy

This is the aspect given most coverage in existing EU documents and in public debate.

Under this approach, the most obvious material to consider more closely is the document *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy* (15849/03 PESC 783, 16 pages, approved by the Council of the European Union in Brussels on 12 December 2003), produced by the Secretary-General/High Representative, Javier Solana, as instructed by the Thessaloniki summit in June 2003. It should be pointed out that, before serving as the EU's foreign policy chief, Solana was NATO Secretary-General and, among other things, the top civilian in charge of the bombing of Serbia and Kosovo in 1999.

This report pays a good deal of attention to that document. It is almost the only one to mirror the intellectual input and a conception of peace and security rather than just focusing on arms, institutions, agencies, budgets, etc., as does the media and much public debate much of the time.

The European Security Strategy begins by observing that Europe is enjoying unprecedented peace and stability and that European countries are committed to settling disputes by peaceful means (fully in keeping with UN principles, one may say) and to cooperating through common institutions.

It goes on to note the importance of the United States and NATO in modern European history and points out that the conflicts in the Balkans are a reminder that war has not entirely disappeared from the continent. With its 25 Member States, over 450 million people and 25% of the world's gross national product, the EU is said to be "inevitably a global player". "Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and for building a better world".

The level of ambition is crystal clear. The EU's framework of reference is the whole world, not just EU itself. Peace is on top of the EU agenda and conceptualized as in the UN Charter to mean peace by peaceful means.

It is only natural for the next section to deal with global challenges. It refers to increasingly open borders, greater interdependence between countries and the positive and negative impact of globalisation. It goes on to point out that 4 million people have died in wars since 1990, with 18 million being displaced, and that 3 billion people (half of mankind) live on less than two Euros a day, etc. Thus, there *is* an awareness of the problems of war, refugees and underdevelopment or maldevelopment. Mention is made of the vicious circle of conflict, insecurity and po-

verty and of growing competition for the world's scarce resources, with the point made that Europe is the world's largest importer of oil.

So far, so good. But then it all falls apart in the following section, on key threats to Europe. They are boiled down to the following, almost a carbon copy of those outlined by the Bush administration:

- *Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction* particularly to the Middle East is ranked as the greatest threat. "The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction";
- *Terrorism*: for which Europe is both a base and a target;
- *Regional conflicts*: mention is made of Kashmir, the Great Lakes region in Africa, the Korean Peninsula and the Middle East;
- *Failed states*: bad governance, corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions, crime and terrorism, with Somalia and Afghanistan singled out here;
- *Organised crime*: Europe is said to be "a prime target for organised crime". This involves trafficking in drugs, women, illegal immigrants and arms and in addition "can have links with terrorism".

It's impossible to see how, from a global perspective, Solana arrives at this particular, ranked threat scenario. Neither it is stated how he defines a threat or what timescale he is working on. No explanation is given of why *proliferation* of weapons of mass destruction (and not, say, their *existence*) and terrorism (and not, say, its causes) are classed as the greatest threats.

The section shows no sign at all of any analysis, i.e. definitions of terms, methods, values and criteria applied in classing one thing as more important than another. It could be objected, for instance, that the number of victims of terrorism to date in Europe is infinitesimally small; seen in relation to the inconceivably large number of people who die every day across the globe - and Solana says that EU has a global perspective - the terrorist threat is so tiny that it hardly ought to feature among the top 20 or 30 challenges addressed globally - and hence by the EU. Statistically, moreover, there is probably about as much risk of suffering a terrorist attack during my life as there is of my wife trying to kill me. Prior to 11 September 2001, terrorism had caused only about 1 100 casualties worldwide, some 400 killed and 700 injured, mainly in South America.

As for proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons production and delivery technology, to all intents and purposes, this stems from existing nuclear powers' own activities. The essential provision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed nearly 40 years, is that states that possess nuclear weapons shall reduce and finally abolish them. As a quid pro quo those not possessing such weapons shall abstain from acquiring them and be assisted in obtaining nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, all nuclear-armed countries have turned a blind eye to their own disarmament/abolition obligations, most recently at the NPT conference in May 2005.

Javier Solana then considers the EU's three "strategic objectives", pointing to the EU's need "to think globally and to act locally". The focus now, though, shifts away from the world as a whole. Instead, Solana here states that, "to defend its security and to promote its values", the EU has the following three strategy objectives in tackling the threats identified:

- Since 11 September, the EU has been adopting a number of measures against terrorism;
- For many years, the EU has been working against proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, not least via the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
- The EU and its Member States have been intervening to “help deal with” regional conflicts and failed states, in the Balkans, Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Whereas defence used to be directed against the threat of invasion, with the new threats, the first line of defence will now often be abroad. Without the slightest evidence, Solana asserts that all the mentioned threats are growing and will continue to grow over time and that it is therefore vital that “we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early”.

Solana acknowledges that none of the threats is purely military or can be tackled by military means alone. Use must be made of a range of instruments: intelligence cooperation, police work and judicial, military and other means. He does not go into how they fit in or how they are to be ranked and combined and in what situations. He does, however, maintain that the EU is particularly well-equipped to respond to such multifaceted threats. It is unclear what evidence there is for this or with whom the implicit comparison is being made.

There follows a brief discussion of enlargement and security in relation to the immediate neighbours. The Balkans is cited as an area in which, together with the U.S., Russia, NATO and other partners, the EU has created stability. The Middle East conflict is identified as a “strategic priority” for Europe. Solana goes on to praise international organisations. Strengthening the UN is a European priority. At the same time, the transatlantic relationship forms one of the “core elements” of the entire international system, to which it is of undoubted benefit. Solana adds that it would also be advisable to strengthen the OSCE, the Council of Europe, ASEAN, etc.

The last part of Solana’s strategy paper deals with the policy implications for Europe.

What began with an ambitious global perspective and a broad understanding of security problems now narrows down the focus to what is good for the EU and what can basically be achieved with existing military resources. Here it strikes an astonishingly self-satisfied tone. The EU has made progress towards a coherent common foreign policy and effective crisis management. “We have instruments in place that can be used effectively, as we have demonstrated in the Balkans and beyond”, writes Solana. It could certainly be objected here, however, that anyone who has followed EU policies in the former Yugoslavia from the almost clownish antics of EU white-clad monitors (“icecream men”) to the rather sorry state of affairs in Kosovo at present may wonder why Solana’s paper is so lacking in either self-criticism or humility or both. One would just need to think back to the EU’s premature, unilateral decision in December 2001 to recognise Slovenia and Croatia as independent states, when they did not fulfil the normal criteria for independence and there was no stabilization plan for the rest of the Yugoslav area. In practice, that disastrous policy, pursued under German pressure, led to the outbreak of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina just a few months later.

What the EU needs to do in future, the paper goes on, is *more* of the same: “make a contribution that matches our potential”. It should develop a *full spectrum of capabilities* for crisis management and conflict prevention, a “strategic culture” conducive to early, rapid and, when necessa-

ry, *robust intervention*. The words are once again a straight lift from the American strategic discourse. The EU needs 160 billion euros a year so as to “be able to sustain several operations simultaneously”, writes Solana. The EU is to assist the UN, when asked to do so. However, he then goes on to state that the EU should react *before* countries and situations involving major threats deteriorate, a course for which, like it or not, the UN Charter provides no basis.

According to Solana, the establishment of an EU defence agency (see below for further details) is the right way ahead in the first place. In the paper’s fullest coverage of any one subject, Solana relates how EU countries’ arms production and armed forces can and should be rationalised, coordinated and made more efficient. To be fair, he does also in places point to the need for civilian resources to work with military ones. Yet it is clear which of the two are always predominant in every respect.

Emphasis is repeatedly placed on the EU’s close relationship with NATO, but not with other organisations. We must stand together and work as one, he says. All resources should be brought under “unity of command”: diplomacy, foreign, security and defence policy, development, trade and the environment. With a shared agenda, under joint command, all must be marching in step.

We must, of course, work with others; here again the transatlantic partnership takes precedence, being the only one mentioned. “Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA”. Acting together, we can “be a formidable force for good in the world” and the EU should therefore continue to build up its (mainly military) forces. No doubt, to not appear one-sided, Solana’s last few paragraphs point out that it is worth keeping on good terms with Russia, Japan, China, Canada and India.

Intellectually and politically, from a peace perspective, what can we say about this key document?

First, about what it does in actual fact contain. The document is short on analysis. It begins by making some good points, but goes on to reach increasingly for the military tool kit in pursuit of the idea which in nation states’ hands has wreaked so much havoc in our world: armament and over-armament, use of military means to solve problems not amenable to solution by those means, downgrading of all civilian means and not a word on how to assess what future situations call for more of the one and less of the other. The intellectual input is a kind of mantra-like regurgitation of thinking and comment put forward from the 1950s onwards in Western mainstream strategy discourse. There is nothing to suggest that the EU’s foreign policy chief or his staff have been following international debate and scholarship on these issues over the last few decades.

Most national governments have threats and security policy looked into by parliamentary committees and commissions, as in the case of the Danish defence committees and their reports, in many countries hundreds of pages. It is strange and unusual to have one - already very busy - individual, Mr. Solana, shape the broad lines of a document of such fundamental importance concerning peace between 450 million people and the rest of the world. And, it might be added, rather arrogant of him to undertake the task, which has so clearly been dashed off with little effort in just a few months. It is sloppily and unsystematically written, consists of only 16 pages and may well have been pieced together from past speeches.

Then we should notice what this key document does *not* include anything about:

- *global maldevelopment and the suffering of millions as a problem for security and peace*; nor does it discuss possible links between terrorism and injustice throughout the world;
- *human security and environmental security*; these have become familiar concepts all over the world and are discussed and reported on by research institutes and UN commissions;
- *conflict analysis, dispute resolution, mediation, reconciliation, forgiveness, prevention of violence, etc.*;
- *the civil society perspective*: interaction with, for instance, the academic world and popular movements, aid organisations and other NGOs;
- *nuclear weapons*; nor does it address the fact that the EU is an organisation based on nuclear weapons, both because of many members' relationship with NATO and because France and the United Kingdom are nuclear weapons powers;
- *assessments of international developments* in a number of areas (scenarios) within and outside the EU or, in short, what amounts to a prerequisite for discussion of how defence, security and peace could be organised, given certain assumptions about the future course of world events;
- *every self-criticism regarding the EU's peace and security efforts to date*. Nor are there, therefore, any ideas as to what kinds of skills development, research, training or general education and public information could conceivably boost defence, security and peace efforts by governments and other parties involved.

Solana's overall strategy is, of course, closely bound up with and a reflection of the entire complex made up by EU policy, principles and institutions and by the Constitutional Treaty as regards defence, security and foreign policy. That is also why we have paid a fair amount of attention to the document.

From the EU documents in the list of references at the end of this report, it can quite easily be seen how the military dimension of defence, security and global peace efforts is assigned a dominating real importance.

Although there is much to be found on peace and justice and on the need for civilian dispute handling and crisis management as well as coordination between military and civilian efforts, it is military aspects which: (a) are most extensively commented on; (b) have been addressed by the largest number of EU documents; (c) have been covered by far-reaching decisions; (d) have prompted countries to set specific goals (such as forces targets); in addition, (e) it is in military matters that the EU has introduced cooperation with NATO and the UN; (f) the EU Institute for Security Studies (ISS) shows a conventional security policy perspective in its publications; (g) for specific EU operations in conflict areas, the emphasis is repeatedly placed on military success, etc.

Solana's paper identifies terrorism as the major problem. However, there is nothing in EU policy or the Constitutional Treaty that suggests a deeper understanding of the probable causes of terrorism or the non-violent political and economic means that must be used in coping with such direct violence, which can be interpreted largely in response to structural violence brought to bear by the rich world.

What role do the civilian peace means play in the Constitution?

First, the Constitution does not contain any norm or provision that the EU should primarily endeavour to resolve conflicts by peaceful means, nor that the EU should work for the abolition of war as a social institution. That is, however, the case with the UN Charter, signed in 1945, to which the Constitution refers in places, e.g. in Article 292(2)(c), stating that the Union is to “preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter ...”.

Secondly, one notices that Article 2, on the Union’s *values*, lists a string of values such as freedom, democracy, human rights and equality but not peace. That is strange for an organisation whose roots go back to the Coal and Steel Union and which is often seen as the main reason why Europe has become more peaceful.

Article 3, on the Union’s objectives, states that: “The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples”. Peace is thus the Union’s first stated *aim*.

Whereas virtually all other aims, such as the market economy, trade, defence, rights and institutions, are dealt with in detail in the Treaty, there is no addressing of the issue or further fleshing out in the case of peace, the Union’s prime aim. Qualitatively speaking, then, there is not much to be gleaned.

Using an electronic search facility within the PDF documents making up the body of the Treaty, it can soon be seen that the picture is even barer in quantitative terms². Words such as “peace/peaceful” occur eight times in the Treaty. The phrase “conflict prevention/prevent conflicts” occurs five times. The words “defence/defence policy” are used 64 times, “security/security policy/internal security” 81 times, “military/combat forces” 21 times and “terrorism/terrorist” ten times. The new EU Minister for Foreign Affairs is referred to 71 times.

Of course, that is not the whole story; it is, after all, natural enough that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose role and powers are described in detail, should appear in the text more often than general words like peace.

Yet it is still quite telling. The use of words referring to peace and conflict prevention is outnumbered by the use of words referring to all those other matters by about twenty to one. The word “disarmament” occurs only once, in connection with intervening to disarm others outside the EU.

The imbalance becomes even clearer when terms like “confidence-building”, “arms control”, “reconciliation”, “détente”, “arms reduction” and “non-violence” are found not to occur at all in the Constitution. Nor do the words “nuclear weapons” or “atomic weapons”, even though such weapons form an integral part of the security strategy of most EU countries, either as members or applicants for NATO membership or as nuclear powers (France and the United Kingdom), and even though the compatibility of such weapons with international law is open to doubt.

2 Numerical findings based on the Danish language version.

What actions have been taken by the EU on civilian resources for crisis management?

There is little material available about this issue, but EU crisis management is taking shape. Some of the relevant documents concerning civilian resources can be found at:

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cp.htm

http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/cpcm/cp/rep.htm.

The *Commission communication* on conflict prevention (COM(2001) 211 final) talks of projecting stability by supporting regional integration, trade, aid, democratisation, rule of law, civil society, independent media, equality and security sector reform. This is all to be “projected”. The other kind of effort called for is prompt reaction to crises, with particular reference here to the “rapid reaction mechanism”. It should be noted that all conflict prevention work comes under the European security and defence policy (ESDP) and is carried out by the Commission’s Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit.

In April 2003 that Unit issued a slim publication entitled *Civilian Instruments for EU Crisis Management*. This covers much the same subjects, most of which, it has to be said, come under conventional foreign and security policy rather than *conflict analysis and conflict resolution* proper. It focuses on matters such as political dialogue, sanctions, disaster relief, food and humanitarian aid, mine clearance, democracy and human rights.

It is, of course, open to discussion which aspects properly come, in whole or in part, within what this report terms the security approach, in contrast to the conflict resolution and violence reduction approach. Addressing and fostering respect for human rights, say, could here come under both approaches to peace. What matters is the weight attached to the various aspects, their ranking as against other means, the institutional framework within which they are carried out in the EU, etc.

The present analysis does not set out to assert that the EU has been comprehensively “militarised”, but rather, using various indicators, shows that there is quite a heavy imbalance in favour of the conventional security approach, carried over more or less unchanged from national security thinking to the supranational level.

Crisis management will be carried out within the General Secretariat (General Affairs Council). The Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper), composed of Member States’ ambassadors, takes many of the decisions, after the various issues have been discussed in working parties. The focal point of the crisis management structure is the Political and Security Committee (PSC). Meetings are attended by representatives of the European Commission and the Council Secretariat, the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PU) and the EU Military Staff (EUMS). The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management does not attend meetings, but does give advice. Then there is the EU Military Committee (EUMC), composed of Member States’ defence chiefs, to advise Solana, Secretary-General (SG) and High Representative (HR) for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CF-SP). The PU, set up following the Helsinki summit in 1999, is attached to Solana’s office, which also houses the Situation Centre (SITCEN), combining civilian and military expertise for assessment of intelligence information.

The latest two documents on civilian resources are quite interesting, as they lend further weight to the impression that professional conflict analysis and conflict resolution are not in progress or under development at the EU. In December 2004 the Council adopted what is known as the Civilian Headline Goals for 2008. These set out aspirations for the European security and defence policy (ESDP). They involve six conflict prevention areas in which to build up capacity by 2008:

- (1) Deployment of integrated civilian crisis management “packages”;
- (2) Conducting of concurrent civilian missions and other EU operations;
- (3) Rapid decision-making, within five days;
- (4) Cooperation with the military;
- (5) Promotion of internal consistency and functional division of labour in EU-actions
- (6) Responding to assistance requests from other international organisations, including the UN.

In its March 2005 issue, the *European Security Review*, published by the International Security Information Service (ISIS), Europe, comments that this “is the first attempt to systematically identify, using military methodology, what civilian capacities the EU needs to develop in order to be effectively operational, as envisaged in the European Security Strategy”. According to the same source, work on developing civilian capacity will be carried out at the Secretariat (DG IX) by, for the time being, a team of eight Council officials, supplemented by staff from Member States. (Individual issues of the magazine can be downloaded from the ISIS website:

As can be seen, this represents a very limited organisational and resource input for civilian aspects, which will be entirely hemmed in by the military-run ESDP.

The EU’s “priority” areas for civilian crisis management and intervention in non-member countries are as follows: *police* training, support for a credible *judicial* system, improvement of countries’ *civilian administration* and also *civil protection* as regards natural or other disasters, an aspect brought to the fore by the tsunami. The Netherlands Presidency has calculated the number of trained personnel ready to be deployed in EU operations: 5 700 police officers, 631 legislative specialists, 565 administrative specialists and nearly 5 000 civil protection specialists. In addition, Member States have made available just over 500 volunteers as monitors and just under 400 volunteers for other support purposes.

As regards staff, the EU Military Staff, for instance, including military and civilian experts, will number around 100, twice the size of the old WEU (Western European Union, now partly integrated into the EU, with Solana as Secretary-General) and half the size of NATO’s international military staff. There will be around 100 military experts to assess intelligence. In addition, according to its May 2005 annual report, the European Defence Agency (EDA), set up in January 2004, already has over 70 posts filled and 50 administrative staff.

To sum up, it is worth quoting what the magazine *European Security Review*, from which the above structural summary is taken, wrote back in October 2000:

“In comparison with the preparation for the military assessment of information relating to crisis management, the new civilian structures within the Council look relatively impoverished. The Policy Unit has a total of 20 staff who will be hard-pressed to meet the

challenge of processing information from member states, open sources (including reports from NGOs) and the other EU institutions.” (*European Security Review*, October 2000).

It is quite plain that the civilian side is not being given priority. Sweden, for instance, a major advocate of that side, maintains, along with other EU politicians, that the civilian committee is vitally important, while the military one should be used “only” as a last resort. As matters now stand, however, that is not credible. Clearly, there is not enough staff and other resources to effectively monitor and analyze the many aspects of situations in conflict areas around the world. And that is of relevance, as the EU has *not* placed any limits on where it might intervene and has made the peace and security of the entire world its concern.

If only because of this imbalance between civilian and military resources and activities, it is open to doubt whether peace was the value or objective foremost in the Constitution writers’ minds.

EU external action

So much for the general picture. Let us now take a closer look at the provisions, mainly in the proposed Constitution’s chapter on “the Union’s external action”, putting into practice the EU’s militarily dominated conception of peace. The common foreign and security policy (CFSP) covers all areas of foreign and security policy; they are all brought together in one place. It is the European Council (Heads of State or Government) which identifies the Union’s strategic interests and objectives in foreign, security and defence policy (Articles 40 and 293) and “the Member States shall support the common foreign and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity” (Article 294). The Foreign Affairs Council elaborates the Union’s external policies on the basis of strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and ensures that the Union’s action is consistent. It is chaired by the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs (Articles 24 and 296).

This must be regarded as a quite centralist model. All areas of foreign, security and defence policy come within the scope of the EU top leadership’s decision-making, not just some or most of them. The Union is in practice attempting to run countries’ security policy. The only exception, being in a way beyond or “above” the EU’s powers, is where its Member States are variously bound by NATO commitments (Article 41). It should also be pointed out that every Member State is required to support the CFSP “actively and unreservedly”.

While the Union has “united in diversity” as its overall motto, for these policies it thus allows virtually no scope for any Member States which might form their own views of a situation and come to different conclusions concerning action from those considered correct at the top. Where in an “international situation” the EU is to decide to take action, “the European decisions ... shall commit the Member States in the positions they adopt and in the conduct of their activity” (Article 297). This is further reinforced by the possibility of majority decisions and of enhanced cooperation between Member States possessing special resources (of which more below).

Article 40 requires Member States to consult the EU before taking any decisions that may affect its interests. The question arises, incidentally, of how the EU would have handled the Iraq war, had that rule been followed. On the one hand, France and Germany did not consult all the others before co-

ming out against the war and, on the other, belligerents such as Italy and Denmark did not consult the others about taking part. Or *if* they did, the Union in any event did not manage to formulate and pursue a common policy on that important issue. (I have written at length on the role it would have been desirable for the EU to play, in the book *Forudsigelig Fiasko. Konflikten med Irak og Danmark som besættelsesmagt* [*Predictable Fiasco. The Conflict with Iraq and Denmark as an Occupying Power*], Tiderne Skifter 2004).

Article 294 also stipulates very restrictively that Member States “ shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations”. In practice, this means that the way in which the Union operates prevents any kind of independent thinking or policy not regarded as compatible with the Union’s interests. Where, moreover, do the Union’s interests lie? On the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq alike, the Union could not reasonably be said to have had any common interest, let alone a common policy.

What the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) is *not* about, then, is the various Member States making different assessments and shaping different policies and then arriving at a common policy where their interests may coincide. A comparison can be made here with the classical idea of Nordic balance, which worked rather well and for decades shaped the Nordic countries’ relations with one another and with the world around them. The principle was that, as well as looking after their own national interests, countries also made allowance for differences in security policy profile among other Nordic countries, e.g. on alliance membership, neutrality, nuclear reservations or vulnerability.

The EU in practice (and practice means that big countries will doubtless for many years to come do as they please, regardless of any common policy) involves the direct opposite of diversity: unanimity, enforced orthodoxy, a single voice, joint command and a duty to stand together and not go it alone. That can hardly serve as a model for increasing democracy in the international community and neither is it in harmony with the idea of unity in diversity.

That the EU has not yet managed to pursue a common policy reflecting common interests is not the main point we are trying to make. The real point here is that this is the aim to be pursued by the EU until such time in the future that it is achieved. That makes it extremely hard to see this entire edifice as a reflection of the EU motto “united in diversity”. On foreign policy, security policy, defence and hence peace, the proposed Constitution *simply does not allow any diversity*.

It should also be pointed out that the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs alone represents the EU: “he or she shall conduct political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf and shall express the Union’s position in international organisations and at international conferences” (Article 296). It thus looks as though national foreign ministers cannot speak on the Community’s behalf. Or to put it more pointedly, once the EU’s top level has determined its policy, national foreign ministers are in reality left with only those powers which relate to areas outside EU territory and outside the common foreign and security policy, including NATO matters.

Lastly, Articles 419 and 420 stipulate that states may establish *enhanced cooperation between themselves* within the foreign and security policy sphere as well. They may do so after various consultations ha-

ve been carried out and as decided by the Council. This leaves the way open for big, militarily strong countries to direct the course of events, as France and Germany have for years been doing, in part by way of their joint combat units. The Constitution will further increase the scope for this.

In-built vulnerability in the event of policy failure

Philosophically and intellectually, this whole edifice, “increasing convergence” as the principle is repeatedly referred to, makes for a greater risk of mistakes as well as for greater policy vulnerability. Smaller and newer Member States will be aware that, realistically speaking, they have to fall into line. Inputs of independent analyses and assessments will decrease: they will be pointless if they lead to policy recommendations unacceptable to the larger and older Member States. Stimulating interpretations of complex challenges and of how to tackle them will in the process have to give way to jockeying for position and horse-trading: “if we back you on this issue, we expect you to ...” Substance, including ethics, will come last.

Moreover, if there is just one policy for the entire Union and everyone has to show solidarity and be committed to that policy, there will be all the more difficulty should that one policy at some point turn out to be wrong. Everyone would then, as it were, have fallen into the same trap.

The alternative would be a more active role all round, multiple inputs and a common platform, combined with decentralised sub-policies and initiatives, as individual Member States’ relative resources permit. This would give an intellectually decent process that could promote diversity, rather than the regimented, bureaucratic pattern of a single policy - unity in uniformity - constantly reducing diversity, creativity and alliance building between stronger and less strong countries.

Particular attention should be paid to Articles 40 and 41

These two articles set out the specific provisions relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence policy (CSDP).

Article 41 lays down that *the Union may engage in operations outside the Union*. This article also states: ‘The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides.’

In passing, we can compare this with the wording of the same passage in the Treaty of Nice of 2001: ‘...including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which *might* lead to a common defence, *should* the European Council so decide’. *Now the CFSP will thus - indisputably - lead to a common EU defence.*

Article 41 also states: ‘Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities.’ This article also establishes the European Defence Agency for armaments, strategic research and military capabilities, which is to ‘identify operational requirements, to promo-

te measures to satisfy those requirements, to contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, to participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and to assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities’.

As far as the author is aware, no other constitution or basic law requires that an actor upgrade its military capabilities - and, what is more, the Constitution does so without a single word about the specific threats that are to be countered. By thus advocating the requisition of armaments, and not once mentioning its Member States’ ambitions to reduce the world’s - or its own - arms arsenals, the EU dispenses with any serious chance of being termed a peace project.

The European Defence Agency (EDA) confirms the supranational expansion of what is known in other contexts as the military-industrial complex. It should be noted in passing that there is no corresponding EU body concerned with the civil aspects of its foreign, security and defence policy. The EDA is intended to help Member States, by all means possible, to jointly increase the EU’s military strength. The Council governing it consists of the Defence Ministers of the Member States, and it, too, is headed by Javier Solana. Its annual budget of EUR 25 million does not sound much in itself but, considering it is to be used to promote coordination, research and improvements in efficiency, on top of the Member States’ defence budgets, it is a considerable sum in the introductory phase. (More about EDA on its homepage <http://www.eda.europa.eu>).

It is further noted that Article 41 states: ‘Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework.’ This provision can hardly fail to give some kind of priority to the militarily best-equipped countries. In practice, it can be assumed that EU policy will be strongly influenced, in a number of cases, by the points of view of the Member States which are comparatively most militarised, as these already have special enhanced cooperation and, within this, are likely to have greater solidarity with one another than with the less-militarised Member States. This undoubtedly raises the question as to *whose* interests are defined - and forced through, if necessary - as the EU’s ‘common interest’.

Article 41 also makes clear *that the EU attaches far greater importance to its relationship with NATO than to its relationship with the UN*. The principle behind NATO, that an attack against one member is to be considered as an attack against all, also becomes one of the EU’s principles under paragraph 7 of this article. The paragraph in question underlines the importance of cooperating as closely as possible with NATO, and makes reference to the article of the UN Charter concerning the right of self-defence.

Before we discuss further the EU’s relationship with the UN, it should be pointed out that Article 214(3) of a *previous* version of the draft Constitution (from December 2003) contained the following wording, *which is no longer used*: ‘The United Nations Security Council shall be informed immediately of any armed aggression [against an EU Member State] and the measures taken as a result.’

The final version of the draft Constitution no longer says anything about the relationship between the EU as a common entity, on the one hand, and the UN Security Council, on the other. All it says is that the Member States France and the United Kingdom are to maintain relations

with the UN Security Council, and that Member States which are also members of the Security Council shall work to secure that the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs be invited to present the Union's position at the Security Council.

What has happened to the text? Firstly, at least in the Danish translation, the word *aggression* has been replaced with *væbnet angreb* ['armed aggression']: terminology matching that of Article 51 of the UN Charter, which is also referred to in Article 305 of the current version of the Constitution. What, then, does Article 51 of the UN Charter say? This is the article stating that a member state that is under attack has the right of individual or collective self-defence until the Security Council has taken a decision on action to restore international peace and stability. It also states, however, that measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defence are to be immediately reported to the Security Council and that these should not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council to take action against these attacks and to promote international peace.

The only place where - very brief - mention is made of the UN Security Council is Article 305 of the draft Constitution. This article states that 'Member States which are also members of the United Nations Security Council' - in other words, the United Kingdom and France - 'shall concert and keep the other Member States and the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs fully informed. Member States which are members of the Security Council will, in the execution of their functions, defend the positions and the interests of the Union, without prejudice to their responsibilities under the United Nations Charter.'

The wording is not very transparent. For example, one cannot help wondering how the United Kingdom and France, with their diametrically opposed positions and policies, are to champion the Union's positions and interests in the event of future situations of the type seen in Iraq. The war and occupation of Iraq, and also the bombardment of Serbia, were carried out without a UN mandate. What is the significance of the phrase '*without prejudice to [these countries'] responsibilities*' as members of the UN? Surely such responsibilities can be presumed to consist in complying with the spirit and the letter of the UN Charter rather than violating these, as in the two cases mentioned above? Although the EU's real interest in the UN thus seems to be narrow both from a legislative point of view and in political practice, it nevertheless wishes to exert influence on the UN.

Finally, Article 41 is interesting in that it clearly states *that the European Parliament has absolutely no real say in these fields*; it will merely be regularly consulted and kept informed of developments. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs is to ensure, however, 'that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration', as Article 304 puts it.

The military-industrial dimension

The present review focuses more on thought, concepts and politics than on technical and economic aspects. It should be mentioned, however, that the EU's positions - as reflected in both the draft Constitution and political practice - are strongly influenced by the driving forces in the fields of industry, technology, trade, research and development, and in the large national, European and global companies.

Over the last three or four decades, successive European actors have been working on coordinating and rationalising the research, development and production of advanced military equipment. This has involved coordination, standardisation and interoperability, and efforts have been made to reduce duplication and inefficiency. By thus diminishing the national profile in favour of the pan-European profile, they hope to improve, in time, the European position in comparison to the US military industry, in particular. This is closely related to the equally long-running discussion on the sharing of defence costs between the European arm of NATO, on the one hand, and the US-Canadian arm, on the other.

Malena Britz's doctoral thesis, *The Europeanization of Defence Industry Policy* (Department of Political Science, Stockholm University, 2004) convincingly documents a strong upsurge in the *Europeanisation* of the Member States' military industries over the last 10-15 years, in particular, which means that decisions on such matters are increasingly being taken within a European rather than a national framework. This can be seen as part of the overall trend towards internationalisation, concentration and merging into ever larger units, and as part of what is known as globalisation. In practice, small countries such as Sweden, in particular, but also large ones such as France, have had to abandon the idea of military self-sufficiency. On the one hand, growing integration results in job losses in certain national industries, but, on the other hand, there are economic and other benefits to be had from participating in joint supranational projects, where each of the participating States takes a share in production.

A new study by the Brookings Institution in the United States, *The Rise of Europe's Defense Industry*, by Seth G. Jones, demonstrates very clearly that companies active in the European military industry are increasingly seeking cooperation with other European companies rather than with those in the United States or elsewhere in the world. The same profile applies to acquisitions and mergers.

SIPRI, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's overview of the world's top 100 arms-producing companies for 2003 (excluding China) shows that 40 of these are based in EU Member States. Although their combined size is small compared with the leading US companies, this does not mean that they do not have a considerable influence on the development of the Union's defence and other industrial policies. According to Amnesty International, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom alone accounted for a third of the world arms trade between 1994 and 2001. The draft Constitution obliges Member States to improve their military capabilities. This means an increase rather than a decrease in arms production, which will by definition lead to more arms exports and trade in military technology, for the simple reason that, in order to achieve good unit prices, the number of units produced must be increased - even beyond a country's own needs.

The market for this will be outside Europe, not least in some of the most authoritarian countries in regions such as the Middle East. It follows from this that national parliaments are likely to find it increasingly difficult to adopt laws that restrict the export of arms, arms technology and ammunition. What is currently driving EU companies active in the military industry into each other's arms, and why is the European Constitution instructing all Member States to acquire armaments? One possible general answer lies in the great extent, as demonstrated in this review, to which the EU depends on the traditional national military-based security concept, albeit transferred to the supranational level. Another general answer is that *political* Europeanisation renders *military-industrial* Europeanisation increasingly necessary. Conversely, a third answer lies in the fact that super advanced technology, rationalisation, economies of scale, mergers, production for the common market and fierce competition on the international arms market are trends that can also be seen in the civil sector. In the military field,

this development is naturally nudging the demand for common supranational policies. Finally, too, we should not forget that military expenditure and investment by Member States has been falling in recent years, albeit only slightly. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, expenditures on equipment by the Western European members of NATO fell by 3% between 2000 and 2002, and so did their arms exports. There is much to suggest that there will be an upward rather than a downward trend in military expenditure and arms production in the coming years.

An important factor emerges from the following opinion of the chief executive officers of Europe's three largest military industries, BAE Systems, EADS and Thales:

“Industry in Europe is under enormous competitive pressure from the United States. With US defense R&T investment running at around eight times that of Europe's fragmented total and with substantial growth in the Pentagon's vast procurement budget [...] American industries are reaching new heights.” They continue that intra-European defense consolidation is critical because European governments and industry do not “wish to see indigenous defense technology overtaken or dependence on foreign technologies become a necessity.” (Quoted from the above-mentioned Brookings report.)

The present degree of militarisation of the EU should not be exaggerated: it will take considerable time before the EU has a single, united military machine and, currently, the EU is absolutely no match for the US military industry. Conversely, it would be irresponsible to underrate what has already been decided and the indications given by all the declarations of intent and decisions made to date: that the EU is capable of becoming a militarised superpower - a strong one, even - second only to the most militarised actor in world history: the United States.

On the basis of what has been said here, it can be concluded that there is nothing in the EU's overall position on direct violence to indicate that the EU is a peace project in the sense of wanting to help reduce the amount of direct violence, the military in particular, in the world. Increased use of force of arms and militarisation of policies is a possible consequence that no one - neither supporters nor opponents of the Constitution or of the EU as a whole - should ignore.

In a great many respects, the EU as a peace project is not nearly as intellectually consistent and advanced, as universal or as oriented towards non-violence as the UN Charter. *Indeed, it is rather the case that the draft Constitution is a massive step backwards in relation to the standards and values of the UN Charter.* There is not a glimpse of a desire for a general reduction in violence in Europe or the world as a whole, or of considered, principled, professional conflict management with the emphasis on civil means, or of universal disarmament - including nuclear disarmament - underneath the few entirely non-binding expressions about the desirability of peace in the world. Finally, it is evident that the draft Constitution does not see fit to pay any attention to disarmament, arms control or any other direct demilitarising measures.

2. Security - the EU and structural violence

As we have explained, structural violence is violence that is inherent in the global system, entails great inequalities and tensions, and finds expression in what is usually called the development issue, in poverty and hunger.

We shall examine, therefore, if there are any indications that the EU is willing or able to help reduce the disparities or, to put it another way, help reduce structural violence in the world.

In order to do this, we have to think about what it is that has for centuries been causing the world to go awry in spite of historically unique economic growth and scientific and technological progress. The jury is out on this.

There are good arguments to support the thesis that the global capitalist market economy and an increase in free trade produce growth (far more than, for example, socialism in the Soviet Union), at least in certain regions of the earth. Proponents of this view usually argue that there must first be growth before the benefits are distributed more evenly: by means of development aid, for example. Equally, there are good arguments to support the opposite thesis, namely that the way capitalism - which now reigns supreme in the world economy - works in day-to-day practice is such that there are (some would say numerically, others would say relatively) ever more poor and underprivileged individuals; that the disparities between incalculable wealth and abundance, on the one hand, and poverty, ill health, suffering and death, on the other, are only growing; and that, for example, development aid is both too little and - perhaps - not even the right means.

Javier Solana's paper on the EU's security strategy states, among other things, that half the world's population lives on less than two Euros a day and that sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. Solana even states that 45 million people die every year of hunger and malnutrition alone; that is at least 123 000 each day!

So evidently the Member States and their 'Minister for Foreign Affairs' are not at all unaware of the problem of structural violence. Indeed, Member States account for as much as 55% (USD 43 billion) of the total official development aid in the world, which equals 0.36% of the overall economy. By way of comparison, the United States gives USD 19 billion, which corresponds to 0.19% of its total economy, and the figure for Japan is USD 9 billion, or 0.19% of its economy. (Denmark, Luxembourg, Holland, Norway and Sweden are still the only countries exceeding the United Nations target of 0.7% of gross domestic product.) Yet EU Member States spend around USD 195 billion each year on military defence, and the United States USD 4-500 billion.

If one supports the hypothesis that global capitalism is causing the world to go further awry day by day, it is striking that the EU does not express awareness of this or consider that structural redistribution should take place in our countries, too, by, amongst other things, making changes in the fields of trade, investments, consumerism and overexploitation of the world's limited resources. The European Constitution does deal with the national economies and the global economy, the environment and human rights - but as separate 'subjects'. Nothing reveals

that the writers of the Constitution appreciate the interconnection between these problems and their solutions.

There are presumably several ways of explaining these *structure-blind* politics. Since capitalism is the overwhelmingly dominant economic system at present, it is often asserted that, despite all its drawbacks, it is naturally the best. The market, privatisation and free trade assume the nature of a mantra, a kind of magic formula to solve all problems. Secondly, no Western leader has the courage to speak up and say that the well-being of the rich countries is based to a significant extent on wrongful control over the resources of others, disparity in earnings between different parts of the world, unfair terms of trade and pure power politics. Solving the problems of underdevelopment (structural violence) would require - apart from aid - quite substantial changes in lifestyle in the rich parts of the world.

In turn, this would require a new attitude to the meaning of 'society's development', to civilization and globalization; it would also presuppose a new kind of global economics to replace the outdated national economics that still seems to prevail in our educational establishments. After all, in practice, there are no longer any isolated national economies.

Finally, the effects of *the fact that all the leading Member States are former empires/colonisers - Portugal, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, Italy* - should not be underestimated. If we bring to bear a little macro-historic knowledge combined with some knowledge of Western values, self-knowledge and Christian missionary thinking, the whole structure of the EU emerges as largely a continuation of a centuries-old paradigm, and anything but a visionary new chapter or a confrontation with the barbarism and mistakes that have been committed by its members around the world in the past.

Surprisingly, the Constitution's only response to the question of the systemic dominance of men over women is - the few times that women are mentioned - to make mention of equality, and to state that trafficking and other offences against women should be put to an end. Nowhere is a connection made between trafficking and an overall understanding of men's dominance over women.

In a nutshell, the world-view that emerges from the Constitution is exceptionally traditional. The text seems to have little awareness of global problems and their causes beyond the merely declaratory. There is no reference to reports on the profoundly serious state of the world or to measures to improve the situation, and nowhere is there a direct or indirect appeal to the Member States to meet the obligations they have signed up to at the UN on issues such as disarmament, solving the poverty problem and other Millennium Goals.

3. Security - the EU and cultural violence

The EU subscribes to a number of traditional values and standards. Let us look first at the Preamble of the Constitution. It highlights the common European cultural, religious and humanist heritage, the contention that Europe has brought forth civilisation, and Europe's adherence to the concept of the central role of the individual and his or her inviolable rights. The 2003 version of the text stated that the values underlying humanism were equality of persons, freedom and respect for reason, and that the EU would strive for peace, justice and solidarity throughout the world. These intrinsically important values - humanism and reason - have now been omitted, but peace, justice and solidarity remain. The Constitution text also states that the eminent leaders are aware 'of their responsibilities towards future generations and the Earth' when pursuing 'the great venture which makes of [Europe] a special area of human hope'. It is difficult - at least for the author - to discern any clear meaning in these words on the European venture, even after reading them several times.

Then there is the motto 'united in diversity', which must have been borrowed from the thousand-year-old Indian philosophy of *unity in diversity*. The classical thinking is that, despite the apparent dissimilarity between spheres in a community, they have an underlying unity: the philosophical term for this is 'monism' (*advaita*). The opposite of monism is 'dualism' (*dvaita*), which conveys the idea that there is an essential distinction between mind and matter, and between matter and thought.

The objection may be raised at this point that, in practice, and based on the Constitution text, the EU as a political actor is specifically *dualistic* rather than monistic. Spiritual, cultural and non-material aspects, rights and the philosophy of man, etc., function merely as a framework for the essentially material, economic and military structure. In essentials, the Constitution is bereft of both spirit and ideas, in the strict sense of the words. Nor are its practical policies based on a comprehensive view of the past, the present day, or the long-term path the world and Europe itself may wish to take. The draft Constitution contains specific chapters on economic aspects, decision-making processes, institutions, military aspects, and rights - but these are not coherent, nor do they provide each other with any input; and, besides, they are suspended in mid-air in relation to all the talk about cultural heritage, values and culture. As we have seen, neither the Constitution nor any other document makes any effort to explain how words such as peace, security, justice and sustainable development shall be understood.

If we read the Preamble and compare it with the corresponding text in the UN Charter, for example, striking instances of a Eurocentric rather than a global viewpoint come to light. Furthermore, the UN Charter starts with the words 'We the *peoples* of the United Nations...', indicating the people on whose behalf it is speaking (even though the UN is more government-than people-oriented) whilst the European Constitution starts by saying that the kings, presidents, queens and grand dukes of the EU are 'drawing *inspiration* from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe...' and thus establishes what it is all about.

Title I contains the definition and objectives of the Union. Article 1 states, among other things, that the Constitution *reflects* the will of the citizens and States of Europe to build a common future. As Étienne Chouard writes in *Franske Stemmer (French Voices)* from *NewAgenda*, however, a

constitution is not something granted to the people by those in power; it is a pact between citizens and governments, and it is through this pact that citizens agree to obey laws, and upon it that the authority bases its legitimacy. To *reflect* a vague European cultural heritage and a similarly vague interpretation of the 'will' of hundreds of millions of people 'to build a common future' - and to do so with the particular help of a Union - is rather an unfortunate strategy, and could give rise to the reasonable assumption that it is claiming for itself authority it does not have.

Some of the values set out in the Preamble are repeated in Article 2 on the Union's values - human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, human rights, etc. The Danish translation uses the word *ligestilling* ['equal opportunities'] rather than *lighed* ['equality']; it is important that the Constitution speak plainly of equality between women and men.

Article 3 lays down the Union's objectives. The first paragraph states: 'The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples', which can only mean that peace is the Union's principal objective. One of the intentions of the present analysis has been to demonstrate that peace is indeed being dealt with very superficially and simplistically throughout the draft Constitution and in political practice, given the fact that peace is the Union's ultimate objective.

Essentially, the intention is that the EU inwardly protects and develops its *own* values, including showing respect for linguistic and cultural diversity *within* the Community. Neither the Preamble nor the articles on EU objectives mention openness to cultures outside the EU or the need, for example, for Europe to interact with, learn about and learn from these cultures - including learning from those who come to Europe with cultural baggage from non-European regions. Nowhere does the Constitution mention how important education and opinion formation is in terms of creating dialogue and trust among different cultures.

It does, however, refer to classical Western/Christian missionary thinking. This can be seen in Article 3(4), for example, which states: 'In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests.' Taken literally, these words open the way to what, in the classical sense, could be called imperialism and penetration of non-European cultures and civilisations, something that is entirely consistent with Member States' legacy as imperial powers (this legacy is not, however, mentioned).

The Union is to promote and uphold *its* values and interests; this means upholding its values if they come under attack or meet with opposition outside the EU itself. It is its *own* values, rather than the right of all peoples and cultures to achieve their ambitions and potential, which are being upheld. Nor is there any mention of an exchange of cultural values, the promotion of a global ethic, multiculturalism or of learning from others; not once does the Constitution use the word *dialogue* with regard to relations between Europe and other cultures. If dialogue is at the heart of the concept of democracy, therefore, the EU cannot be said to be setting the stage for the global spreading of democratic ideals as such. The following passage, well hidden in a subsection of a section, in paragraphs on the internal market (Article 167), reveals that cultural values and strong economic interests can come into conflict - and also shows which ones carry more weight: 'The following may be considered to be compatible with the internal market: ... aid to promote culture and heritage conservation *where such aid does not affect* trading conditions

and competition in the Union to an extent that is contrary to the common interest' (my italics). Part II of the Constitutional Treaty consists of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union:

'Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. It places the individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by creating an area of freedom, security and justice.'

In the introductory text to Part II, the Constitution chooses not to postulate a common European identity; instead it talks about a common cultural heritage and common values, whilst pointing out the great diversity of cultures within Europe. This could be said to express the 'united in diversity' concept - but within the Union, of course, not in relation to the global community.

More problematic is the express assertion in the Preamble to the Constitutional Treaty *that European values, which are completely individual-centric, are universal*. We are not taking a position here on the extensive debate as to whether certain values are universal or particularistic. What does, however, merit emphasis is that many people in non-Western cultures will most certainly disagree with the West extolling its own European/Western values as universal - that is to say, as applying to them, too - and will also consider the historical attempts to force these values on them most objectionable.

Considering the major problems of intercultural understanding which Europe currently faces, and considering that the decision on the draft Constitution is being taken at a time of growing risk of cultural conflicts, particularly between parts of the Christian West and parts of the Islamic world, the whole treatment of other cultures and the EU's role in relation to them could be described as *passé* - indeed, as though it were the product of a missionary 'colonial mind'.

In fairness, however, it must be said that there is nothing to suggest that the EU has any desire to contribute to an increase in cultural violence. The wording and policies in the Constitution are self-centred and non-global rather than a direct expression of an active philosophy of dominance and attempts to subordinate others. That being said, the draft Constitution seems to be culturally out of step with both the present and the future. If one took a minute to empathise with the situation of a young African or Arab and his or her hopes for new signals from the West, the draft Constitution would presumably come across as bereft of both vision and hope.

4. Security - the EU and environmental violence

This will be brief, as the environment does not feature prominently in the Constitution text; environmental considerations are concentrated in Articles 233 and 234 of Part III, which take up approximately two pages. The general section on the Union's objectives has nothing significant to say about man's relationship with nature. The three expressions/terms used throughout the passages on the environment are 'protection of the quality of the environment', 'sustainable development' and 'prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources'. The Constitution also advocates, without going into any detail, the promotion of measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems. Article 292 states, however, that the Union should 'foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty'.

Although the problems surrounding man's dealings with nature rank among the most serious for the long-term survival of humanity - if high-level research reports from at least the last 30 years are to be believed, that is - they are obviously not of any greater importance to the Union.

Naturally, the objective of eradicating poverty is a good thing, but, firstly, poverty reduction does not play a central role anywhere in the Union's objectives (the global poverty problem is mentioned twice in total) and, secondly, the means of fostering a kind of development aiming to eradicate poverty are not at all clear. This is closely related to the following problem, among others, on which the draft Constitution is much clearer and more specific.

The Constitution *requires* that the EU Member States aim for sustainable development *in Europe*; it does not require them to contribute to making the production and consumption of the whole planet sustainable. Sustainable development is to be based on *economic growth*, price stability and a social *market economy*. Whether it is the task of a constitution - whose duration is unlimited - to determine that there shall, indefinitely, be economic growth and that only one economic concept is acceptable, is certainly worth a thorough debate not least in the light of democratic choice.

Stipulating a specific policy or economic system is, to a certain extent, tantamount to preventing the will of the people for something other than a market economy, growth, etc., from asserting itself in future. It is also a means of crushing the popular scepticism, however great, which exists towards these concepts. When, in the same breath, Article 3 states that the quality of the environment shall be protected and improved, the Constitution implicitly ignores, in both philosophical/theoretical and empirical terms, the obvious: that there could be conflicts between perpetual free-market growth, on the one hand, and a better European - not to mention global - environment, on the other.

This is another instance of an imbalance between economic, military and political considerations, on the one hand, and cultural, global and environmental concerns, on the other. Given the enormous environmental problems the world is facing, and given the continued overexploitation of resources for immediate consumption, with scant regard for future generations, it is as

though the authors of the Constitution have been sound asleep since the UN's first environment conference in Stockholm in 1972, have read nothing of the reports of the Club of Rome, for example, and have taken no notice of UNDP or UNEP reports, Human Development Reports or the annual State of the World Report by the Worldwatch Institute.

In addition, to enable the Union to be a leader in global efforts towards achieving a partnership with, rather than dominance over, nature, and towards genuinely long-term thinking and policies, a *global ethic* in general and an *environmental ethic* in particular would not have gone amiss - a set of standards, rules and obligations determining how people and countries must deal with the natural environment if they are to ensure their long-term survival. In this regard, too, the text of the Constitution leaves much to be desired.

The ideas of the EU and the draft Constitution on sustainable development and prudent utilisation of natural resources might have been perceived as forward-looking if they had been laid down in the Treaty of Rome or registered before the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in 1972.

Peace as conflict management and reduction of violence

So much for the analysis and critique. Now we want to present some examples of what the European Constitution and consequently the EU could have had as its vision for peace, security, defence and violence in the world at large - in line with a) its own ultimate goal which is peace and b) the norms of the United Nations Charter in general and that of peace by peaceful means in particular.

Since with respect to the four dimensions referred to above the EU falls entirely within the framework of the traditional, national approach to security with the emphasis on military resources, it is quite unlikely that the EU as a collective player will be able to contribute to reducing the four types of violence in the world. The most hopeful scenario is that the EU will not directly *increase* these types of violence. It will depend to a large extent on whether the individual Member States assume greater shared responsibility for the world than the EU as a joint player appears to be prepared to do.

This study does not claim that the following is a ready-made programme for the whole Union, but indicates what form a peace policy under EU auspices might have taken in the shorter and longer term.

With a view to promoting constructive debate and making the EU and Europe a positive factor for world peace, below follow 25 proposals of varying magnitude which everyone can discuss. They are grouped as alternatives under the four dimensions. They are not listed in any order of priority. A new EU policy must be pieced together from many elements, ideas and measures in various combinations, depending on the circumstances.

5. The EU and the reduction of direct violence

1 • Conflict - early warning, diagnosis, prediction and handling

The EU must in particular improve its ability to diagnose and understand complex conflicts, provide for early warning, early listening and early action and be in a state of readiness to establish talks, dialogue, brainstorming sessions and negotiations in close cooperation with all the parties to the conflict.

2 • Professionalisation and cooperation with civil organisations

We can also see from the poor crisis management in the Balkans over the last fifteen years that most governments and foreign ministers need professional staff and advisers when they have to deal with conflicts, just as they need professionals in tackling military issues. It is quite evident that many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which have people with experience in conflict management have done more good and less harm than many governments. They should have a place in the EU conflict management structure.

3 • Partiality and mixing of roles is counterproductive

We can certainly also learn that no progress is made when individual countries try to play many roles simultaneously: mediators, judges, peace-keepers, peace-enforcers, arms dealers, sanctions-makers, humanists etc. It does not help at all if they have national/nationalistic interests while teaching about bringing about peace together with local parties. The Member States of the EU should try to check all national interests and intervene in as impartial a way as possible, tackling problems rather than players.

4 • Participative conflict management

Peace plans have to be developed both top-down and bottom-up and all parties to the conflict have to feel that they have been listened to and have influenced its resolution. Various peace plans could, for example, be presented ahead of referendums and people could be given an opportunity to vote democratically for the peace plan they consider best able to serve their interests for the future. There is a single reason for this: they are the ones who have to live with it.

5 • Set limits for social engineering

In a number of conflict zones, one of them being Kosovo, we can see that it is not easy to occupy an unstable area and rebuild it as a democracy with tolerance and reconciliation. There has been an unrealistic perception of the opportunities for social engineering in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in the former Yugoslavia. With the experience gained since the end of the Cold War fifteen years ago, the conclusion to be drawn is that it is not possible first to destroy countries' economies, political systems and physical appearance and then immediately afterwards rebuild them in the space of a few years and expect to find happy, secure and reconciled people.

6 • Conflict management is concerned with putting people first

Peace and peace-building are ultimately concerned with putting people at the top of the agenda. We must concern ourselves with people's perception of what it is that distinguishes them from their fellow human beings, how they view themselves, the conflict and the 'others'. We must deal with fear (which is far more important than 'evil' in explaining why people harm one another), with hatred, intolerance, desperation and hopelessness, because it is from these feelings and their politicisation that violence emerges. In brief, we must focus on the fundamental causes of violence rather than merely putting a lid on violence and dealing with it superficially.

7 • Arms Conversion and "transarmament" - Alternative defence linked to human and common security

A historic opportunity appears to be missed by the western world in general and the EU in particular. No countries in the EU feel threatened by another EU Member State and many of them do not see a military threat from any other side. This means that all they need is a defensive military, a civil component and protection for their citizens against trade sanctions, environmental disasters, terrorism and so on. Although it is not possible entirely to rule out the possibility of some form of threatening situation developing in the future, the EU no longer needs any long-range offensive weapons as a deterrent to enemies, as in the past. This should lead to a "transarmament", a new type of defence thinking, to purely alternative methods of defence, principally civilian but perhaps also military (defensive, only to defend a Member State's own territory, but not threatening in the eyes of others). Common security was an idea developed at the end of the Cold War by an international commission chaired by the then Swedish Prime Minister, Olof Palme. It cannot be applied right away today. In a broader perspective, however, the Palme Commission had a very telling point: we cannot build security and trust with anyone if we simultaneously threaten them or have the capacity to threaten or kill them, if one day we were to decide on that course of action.

The Union should therefore develop a fundamentally new defence and peace-promoting security doctrine which is adapted to the non-threatening new Europe but also eliminates any possibility of others viewing the EU as aggressive or purely determined to look after its own interests around the world. Without such a doctrine - and simply with Javier Solana's wholly inadequate paper of 16 pages - it will be a catastrophic error for the EU to venture out on peace, security and stability missions around the globe up to 6 000 kilometres from Brussels as is planned these very years.

8 • Disarmament together with transarmament

The text of the draft Constitution needs to be amended in a number of areas. No constitution should commit any country to a permanent build-up of arms. Nor does this express the will of European peoples. In addition, it is clear that the military imbalance in the entire draft and in policy needs to be redressed. The interests of the arms industries and arms traders should not, as is the case in the present text, be given fundamental advantages and priority, neither in terms of resources nor institutionally. It is astonishing that a military policy is established and an arms agency is set up but no practical measures at all are taken in favour of disarmament, peace education or understanding of conflict or to require the Member States of the EU to comply with UN resolutions on development assistance, alleviation of poverty, disarmament and the establishment of nuclear-free zones.

9 • Assessment of risk of conflict or violence

Ahead of its decisions the EU could - in just the same way that environmental impact assessments are made - assess the risk of increased tension, conflict behaviour and direct violence as a result of a particular EU policy and the likely effects of the policy within and outside the EU. A decision could then be discussed in the light of such a conflict risk analysis.

An increasingly important dimension is to at latent conflicts, which at present are far from being violent and are therefore easier to manage. These may be found in social groups, language communities, minorities in potential conflict with central government, rising racism and xenophobia.

10 • A European Civil Peace Corps (ECPC) and similar initiatives

The idea and a specific proposal has already been floated in the European Parliament.

As well as emphasising political, intellectual and civil early warning and civil conflict management, this proposal gives important evidence that alternatives exist. The first priority for an ECPC will be to transform man-made crises, that is to say to prevent violent conflicts from escalating and help parties to find solution without taking to violence. The ECPC's tasks will be entirely civilian. Special emphasis will be put on preventing violent conflicts because it is more humane and costs less than reconstruction following the use of violence. The Corps could also undertake humanitarian tasks in the aftermath of natural disasters. The ECPC would not limit its involvement to tasks within a particular area (that is to say Europe).

In view of the disappearance of the traditional threat scenario of invasion and occupation, it would make good sense to utilise the expertise and human resources which exist in most countries' civil defence and put them to use in peace-keeping missions abroad. It is easy to imagine an EU Voluntary Service, modelled on the UN or something along the lines of the White Berets, proposed a few years ago by Mexico. The International Peace Brigades already perform an important mission, including escorting refugees who are returning home.

11 • Freedom from nuclear weapons and nuclear-free zones

As long as European states possess nuclear weapons or take part in nuclear-based strategies and policies, the claim that Europe is a peace project should be challenged. Nuclearism is also a problem from the point of view of democracy. Truly democratic countries would allow their citizens to take part in a referendum on issues such as: 'Would you accept that your country is defended through the use of nuclear weapons?' "There would hardly be ten per cent in favour. As long as EU Member States pursue a nuclear policy, they also provide countries which are on the threshold of being nuclear powers with an excuse. As long as some countries possess these weapons, it means that there will be proliferation for the simple reason that others will also want to have the same means of power and prestige.

The whole discussion on the *proliferation* of nuclear weapons and not their *existence* is therefore entirely mistaken. The solution is to abolish them.

12 • The EU can become strong by not imitating and measuring itself against the United States

It is no secret that militarily the EU is far smaller and less effective than the United States. The figures speak for themselves: as mentioned above, the annual military expenditure of the United States is around US\$ 500 billion, while that of the EU is just over US\$ 190 billion. The United States allocates 39 per cent of its military expenditure to personnel, while the EU

spends 61 per cent of its military budget on personnel, which is indicative of how much more technology- and capital-intensive the American defence organisation is. The United States allocates 24 per cent of its defence budget to new equipment, while the EU average is only 14 per cent. And perhaps most importantly for the future, the United States spent US\$ 36.5 billion on military research and development in 1999, while European members of NATO as an aggregate figure spent only US\$ 8.9 billion.

It is rather easy to find experts who think that the American Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is increasing the gulf between Europe and the United States to such a degree that the European military will soon be incapable of operating alongside the Americans because they are so far behind them technologically! They therefore feel that the EU Member States need to rationalise and coordinate their military and increase their military budgets.

For the foreseeable future, EU military actions will be heavily dependent on resources in NATO and the United States, through various forms of intelligence, satellite surveillance, air-lift capacity, encrypted communication systems and so on. These facts must lead to the conclusion that the EU - by choosing military strength as a yardstick - will bring itself into increasingly tough competition with the United States and become dependent on the United States for decades ahead. What the EU should do to become more *independent* is to develop a niche for itself, which will be regarded by the world outside the EU as far more attractive and compatible with the professional conflict management policies and skills needed in the future.

The military dimension of security and defence has been the United States' major strongpoint in recent years, but will also be its inevitable source of weakness in the longer term. Those who in recent years have supported the EU as a project because they are of the opinion that the Union can become the much needed alternative to the global dominance of the United States should bear in mind that the EU can only become such an alternative by doing something different - that is, something other than trying to become militarily strong. It can, in fact, be said that the stronger the Union tries to become militarily, the more dependent it will become on the United States. And it will probably also face problems which are created more by the United States than by the Union itself.

13 • Step up cooperation with the UN, the OSCE and regional organisations

This study shows quite clearly that NATO is the EU's preferred partner in security policy. NATO signifies the United States, but the United States no longer signifies NATO; the US increasingly act unilaterally. EU-NATO cooperation was forced through in the Treaty of Nice, without a similar function being created at the same time in relation to the organisations mentioned above. If EU security and peace policies shall move primarily in the civilian direction, it would be natural to discuss the fundamentally important relations to and solidify cooperation with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which is the foremost existing civilian European security organisation.

The OSCE has some machinery, skills and experience in conflict analysis, early warning and many missions in conflict regions. When the small size and resources of the organisation are taken into account, it displays some rather impressive results, for example as a bridge-builder during the Cold War. As all the states of the former Soviet Union are also members of the OSCE

and the organisation fundamentally espouses civilian conflict resolution, it will be highly appropriate to build peace in cooperation with the OSCE. The OSCE is still severely understaffed, with just a few handfuls of civilians at its Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna. However, it is precisely resources of that kind that the EU itself so clearly lacks. There is therefore much to be gained for all parties from a much closer cooperation.

The EU should therefore as soon as possible coordinate its activities with the OSCE and the UN and with the regional organisations such as the Arab League, ASEAN in Asia and the African Union at least as closely as has already been done with NATO. By actually building on broad partnership around the world and conducting dialogues on peace and security problems and solutions, the EU could quickly become more attractive in the eyes of other parts of the world than the United States is, at any rate at present.

14 • A new NATO could be beneficial for a violence-reducing peaceful EU

‘So what about NATO?’ some people will justifiably ask. The answer could be the following scenario: Strip NATO of its nuclear weapons and all other weapons which are not purely for defence. Next, let the Alliance’s extremely professional civil and military staff be trained in civil defence, conflict management and non-violence - the UN norm of peace by peaceful means.

NATO’s sophisticated intelligence system can be re-employed for early warning of outbreaks of violence and monitoring of peace plans and ceasefires. NATO’s enormous transport capacity can be used to carry humanitarian aid, conduct rescue operations in areas where natural disasters have occurred and help in transporting whatever is required to rebuild war-ravaged communities. NATO could even fight drug trafficking and crime.

If soldiers can be transported anywhere in the world with heavy equipment and made to fight for months on end, it is possible to do almost anything to protect people, to intervene between warring factions and help them to rebuild a normal existence after war. In brief, NATO as a defence alliance would be able to carry out humanitarian operations better and more quickly than any other organisation and could act as a peacekeeper together with the UN and together with the EU.

6. The EU and the reduction of structural violence

15 • *New knowledge and economic and development policy*

If the EU is not simply to market itself as a peace project but actually *be* one, it must help in reducing direct *and* structural violence.

If the EU developed a new economy and new relations with developing/maldeveloped countries and suffering peoples throughout the world and the Union made less and less use of exploitative trade and investment mechanisms, this would make a visible contribution to poverty reduction in the long term and also reduce the risk of war, terror and environmental disasters.

The EU's leaders must be brave enough to say to the citizens of Europe: 'We in Europe are so much more prosperous and have so much more security than those at the bottom of the world community. We need your understanding and help in order to resolve the greatest problem of all and resolve it as quickly as we can: we must abolish once and for all the mechanisms which compel 1.2 billion people to live on less than one dollar a day and 2.4 million to lack adequate sanitation. We in Europe must curb our consumption of luxuries for a while, until these lives are saved in a lasting manner.' (The figures are taken from UNDP, the UN's Development Programme).

16 • *A real humanitarian intervention and tackling the roots of terrorism*

The day the EU's leaders have said and done that, they will have made a greater contribution to world peace than any other organisation in history. They will have given substance to the words 'humanitarian intervention'. They will have globalized humanism, and not merely created economic transactions with gains for only a few. They will have shown that the EU is something new and entirely different from the United States. And they will have shown that all this can be done at a mere fraction of the world's current military spending. And when it has been done, there will be less need for military spending, because wars also arise partly - not only, of course - as a result of inequality, hopelessness and injustices at many levels.

17 • *Abolition of violence against women and children*

Around one in three women around the world are subject to violence in a close relationship. Throughout the world, around 1.2 million women and girls under the age of 18 are trafficked for prostitution every year. There are 100 million children living on the street, there are 300 000 child soldiers and 6 million are wounded in armed conflicts. We have seen how soldiers behave, not just in wars, but also on 'peace missions', for example in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Those who want the EU to become a military-dominated actor cannot also act as a credible force in reducing gender-specific violence and violence against children. In brief, the EU cannot develop in the way the EU's adult, male leaders wish and simultaneously qualify as a peace project.

7. The EU and the reduction of cultural violence

The principal topic in this section is easy to formulate: the present-day *violence-legitimising culture* must be phased out and a new *culture of peace* introduced at all levels. In practice it is a matter of awareness, new forms, education and training, and a more balanced media and entertainment industry. Culture of peace is a concept that has made inroads in a number of contexts, and has become a global movement since UNESCO launched it. Further details can be found at: <http://www3.unesco.org/iycp>. We are midway through the International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-violence for the world's children (2001-2010). The many UN resolutions linked to the culture of peace can also be found here.

18 • *People-to-people: the EU and the world in a transnational perspective*

A good argument for the EU is that the Union helps to bring young people together and helps them to study abroad and in so doing it promotes international understanding. That is all well and good. But it is not enough to improve European-European understanding, which affects no more than a few per cent of the world population. In a globalised world that amounts only to provincialism. Better global understanding - and therefore the possibility of peace - demands many more programmes which enable young Europeans to meet and cooperate with Arabs, Africans, Indians etc. and exchange accommodation for extended periods, provide and receive - mutually, that is - government and NGO assistance and not only one-way, rich-to-poor assistance and inspiration. European countries have something important to learn from others, not just teaching them.

The EU lacks a vision in this area which can generate enthusiasm particularly among younger people under education.

19 • *Education in peace, conflict analysis, conflict resolution and non-violent politics*

If EU diplomats are to act to a greater degree as conflict managers, they need education and training in the basic concepts and skills, just as they would in any other profession such as law, medicine or economics. The Peace Academy, which is mentioned below, could be one place, but universities in the EU could focus more on these topics, and NGOs could also provide some training where they have both practical and theoretical skills.

It is reasonable to assume that young European people and other citizens would be interested in general education in peace and learning about other cultures, ways of thinking and cultures of peace in order to navigate easily through an internationalised, globalised world. The EU could establish a fund with resources to enable international, national, public and private schools and new experimental peace schools and NGO universities to supply systematic peace education for citizens who wish to acquire expertise in these areas. The EU would, thus, help prevent a clash of civilisation.

The idea is not to have a special subject of peace or to make it mandatory. The idea is to develop *a peace and dialogue perspective in all subjects*, whether history, literature, culture, technology or

physics. In addition, there is nothing - apart from lack of vision and creativity - to prevent the EU from making scholarships available for journalists and others who wish to acquire skills in *peace and development journalism*. Along the way there would be coverage of international events focusing more on the underlying conflicts than on the violence, as in typical modern-day war reporting.

20 • European peace academies

The EU does not have any institution for education in peace and conflict resolution, reconciliation and related matters. The Union could easily set up a truly large and broad-based peace academy as part of its overall policy for peace in Europe and the rest of the world. It could be viewed as an umbrella organisation for peace academies in the various countries, government-based as well as civil society-based. They would be places where students, NGOs, officers and diplomats could work together and study peace, conflict resolution, the culture of peace and theories and policies of non-violence, a place where academic publications would also be turned into popular materials and where internet dialogues could be conducted with citizens everywhere.

The Internet and other electronic resources could be used to create mutual education programmes, seminars, debates and skills training in everything that relates to the prevention of violence and peace-making, and programmes could be produced both for Europeans in relation to Europeans and for Europeans in relation to people from developing countries. A new type of peace research institute could mushroom both in conflict-ravaged areas and elsewhere. Europe would consequently be able to tap into the knowledge and traditions that exist around other regions and civilisations about how to create and maintain peace.

21 • Reconciliation institutes in the East and the West, in the North and the South

It would be natural for Europe, which sees itself as a centre of humanism and enlightenment, to focus much more systematically on the human dimension of conflicts, war and peace. It could very well be imagined that centres would be established for research on reconciliation and practical initiatives in places where there are or have been conflicts within Europe - let us say in Serbia or Croatia, the Basque country, Kosovo, or on the line which once marked the Iron Curtain.

The EU could take the initiative for an African-European process of reconciliation aimed at dealing with the damage and harm that has occurred through history, and how it can be used constructively to help the African continent eventually to be regarded as a partner on an equal footing with Europe in relation to culture, religion and many other things. It is only natural for the EU also to initiate an OSCE-like process for security, confidence-building and cooperation with the Middle East and with Islam as a whole. Dialogue, exchange at all levels, mutual visits for education, research etc.

22 • Positive examples - conflict consortia - local expertise

Another task would be to disseminate information about historical and contemporary *examples of successful conflict resolution*, large and small - for instance in the South Tyrol in Northern Italy, the Åland Islands and Schleswig-Holstein. These are many good examples of lasting resolutions of complex conflicts.

The power of example is strong and people around the world need to hear positive stories, stories which provide hope for peace. The EU could also support the establishment of *conflict consortia* in EU Member States - small flexible organisations, in which area experts, former emergency aid workers, retired UN soldiers and civilians, as well as other field workers, NGOs and diplomats come together to assess the risk of violence and conflicts in selected areas and give advice to their governments and the international community on what can be done to prevent violence. Europe is full of people from regions of conflict such as the Balkans and Somalia. The *local conflict and culture expertise* is not used today in any foreign policy decision-making body.

23 • Towards a non-killing Europe?

One of the world's leading researchers in non-violence, Glenn Paige, uses the term *non-killing* to describe the norms and policy which are characteristic of a new development for peace: If we apply Paige's concept of non-killing to Europe, it will have the following characteristics:

- Firstly no European will be killed by a European, and no one will be threatened with being killed.
- Secondly no European will be killed by foreigners, and no one will be threatened with being killed.
- Thirdly no foreigners will be killed by Europeans, and no one will be threatened with being killed.
- Fourthly no Europeans have any weapon to kill one another, no foreigners have any weapon to kill Europeans, and no Europeans have any weapon to kill foreigners.
- Fifthly there are no ideological doctrines - political, religious, military, economic, legal, customary or academic - which allow Europeans to kill Europeans, allow foreigners to kill Europeans, or allow Europeans to kill foreigners.
- Sixthly there is no relationship in European communities - political, economic, social and cultural - and no relationship between Europeans and foreigners which can only be maintained or changed by threats or the use of killing.

The EU is not Europe; the EU is a player in Europe. For the sake of future debate, the broadest possible definition could be chosen and it could be asked: Is a non-killing Europe possible? If not, why not? What are the obstacles? If it is possible, why and how? What positive resources does the EU have?

It can also be asked: What shall we do if the EU promotes a *killing* rather than a *non-killing* Europe in the years and decades to come? What, in brief, is the EU's killing and non-killing capacity now and what will it be in the future? And what is the non-killing and killing capacity of non-EU Europe?

24 • Peace is promoted through constructive proposals and dialogue - in dialogue with power but independent of it

We need thousands of sensible dialogues throughout Europe, broad frameworks and many levels. It can *not* be limited to popular movements, including peace movements, which predominantly talk only about what they are against, or futile activity by those non-governmental organisations, which almost solely undertake lobbying or, entirely or to a great extent, finance their lavish organisations and projects using funds from governments only. It could be said that they

are no longer Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) but have become *Near-Governmental Organisations*. What they work towards are principally small changes to the government agenda without criticising it or coming up with independent *alternatives* to it.

In the previous part of this investigation concern was expressed over the imminent possibility of continued militarisation of the EU. Some claim that there are no alternatives. But this study expresses a firm belief that there are *always* alternatives and that *democracies are characterised by there being alternatives* about which there is a lively debate and citizens maintain real choice.

Peace is promoted by constructive proposals and dialogue. Authoritarian principles and violence is promoted by the opposite. In essence, that is what the global culture of peace is about. One reason why the draft European Constitution has become a surprising defeat for the leaders of Europe, who signed up to what the people are rejecting, is that the EU does not just have a democratic deficit but also lacks the intellectual and moral strength to direct development towards a democratic new culture of peace, in which priority is given to dialogue with citizens and its results are carefully implemented.

8. The EU and the reduction of environmental violence

25 • *A Pact with Nature*

Perhaps one can best illustrate the draft Constitution's lack of vision and holistic thinking by contrasting it with a citizens-produced document which these years gain more and more attention around the world. The document is the *Earth Charter* from 2000 about which you can read more at <http://www.earthcharter.org>.

The Earth Charter covers the fundamental principles that will be needed to build a more just, sustainable and peaceful world in the 21st century. It illustrates excellently how a series of solutions to major world problems and goals such as the Millennium Goals are fundamentally intertwined and, for their realization, requires both a sense of common responsibility and a global ethics of care which go far beyond the borders of the nation-states and reach into future generations. It embodies the basic truth that democracy, peace and non-violence can and must come hand in hand.

The Earth Charter was a spin-off from the 1987 Appeal by the United Nations' Commission on Environment and Development for a Pact between human beings and Nature; it was further promoted and elaborated at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. It starts out with a Preamble which advocates the notion that the Earth is something we humans have a duty to treat with care; it lists the major global problems we face and emphasizes that we are all responsible, albeit in different ways, for creating a sustainable development for the common good of all as well as the environment.

Throughout the Earth Charter, Nature is treated as a partner; it makes an enormous contrast to the EU draft Constitution's implicit view. It places unity with Nature, integrative thinking and permanence in its very centre - in contrast to the anthropocentric (human-dominated), short and egocentric view that pervades Western dualist thinking as well as Western politics in general. It basically asks what is good for all, including Nature, where the EU draft Constitution basically asks what is good for Europe and how can European values be universalized. It does not deal only with human rights but, very noteworthy, also with human duties and collective responsibilities. It builds on a fundamentally non-violence-seeking ethics of care for the Earth. And it holds a long term perspective by including the needs of the yet unborn, coming generations. In summary, it has all the vision and beams all the positive energy that the EU Constitution so conspicuously lacks.

Postscript

This investigative report has attempted to show that the European Union is only a peace project if peace is conceptualized to fit exclusively the nation-state paradigm of the past and if one accepts that - increasing - violence of various kinds is compatible with peace in the future. The draft Constitution is based on a surprisingly old-fashioned, Eurocentric worldview without opening up for a vision of a better world for all, i.e. for the 8 per cent of the world's people who live inside it and the 92 per cent who live outside it. Its analysis of world challenges and threats to Europe is grossly deficient and devoid of modern research-based thinking and methods.

The Union and most of its Member States these years conceive of war and peace and conduct such policies and goals that there is solid reason to fear that the Union, as a project in and of itself, will contribute more to a future increase in violence - direct, structural, cultural and environmental - in the world than to the eminently possible and necessary reduction of it.

We urge everyone to read and discuss this Constitution. Irrespective of its fate, it speaks volumes about how the leaders of the Union think and see the world - and how the appropriate the "will of the people". Whether or not the Constitution will become a formally approved document, rest assured that what is found in it will most likely make a heavy impact on the de facto policies of the EU in years and decades to come.

This being said, there is no denying that the former European Community (EC) and the present EU and its Members have exerted a positive influence on the issues of peace and war in Europe and contributed to the fact that there is no longer any credible threats that war would break out among its Members. But simultaneously, some humility and self-criticism would be appropriate. For there is no evidence that the Union is the *only* reason behind this positive development.

It is reasonable to include other possible explanatory factors. For instance, the role of the non-aligned and neutral states as mitigating "buffers" and "third way" between NATO and the Warsaw Pact deserves mention. So do Social Democratic leaders with personal experiences of World War II such as Willy Brandt, Bruno Kreisky and Olof Palme; they all had a vision and quite some courage devoted to a better, peace-promoting Europe.

The kneeling down of Willy Brandt at the Warsaw ghetto memorial in 1970, the Brandt Commission report on global development, the Palme Commission report on common security, followed up by Egon Bahr, also deserves mention. Regrettably, similar visionaries are hard to find in today's Europe, not to speak of the Social Democracies. The importance of Finland's path-breaking spearheading of the OSCE in the 1970s, thus opening for the end of the Cold War, has probably meant more for peace than the entire EU. Add to these developments in the general improvement in welfare, closer human bonds since 1945, more travel and economic interaction. In the larger perspective it was non-violence that changed Europe and made it possible to avoid the otherwise likely Third World War: the combination of the towering figure of Michael Gorbachev's vision and courageous policies, human rights fighters and dissidents like Sacharov, women, priests, intellectuals, citizens disarmament conferences, the Green Parties at the time and millions of citizens who acted in Solidarnosc, the Velvet Revolution, etc.

The EU as Union had a quite limited role in all that. Crediting it with being the only or the major peace-maker in post-1945 Europe therefore borders on propaganda. The challenges are no smaller today when we need to build peace and justice not only in our own region but throughout the world. Will the EU be the main power for good in this respect? We have shown that this is much less likely to be the case than the EU itself wants us to think. That makes it all the more important to debate inside and outside the Union how it can anyhow become a visionary promoter of peace and open a new more benign and humane chapter in humankind's history. And we must not say it is impossible before it has been tried.

Important documents and selected websites

Most relevant backgrounds and documents can be found here:

http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?lang=en&id=248&mode=g&name

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/euw_global/index.htm

http://europa.eu/pol/ext/index_en.htm

A Secure Europe in a better world. The European Security Strategy, by Javier Solana. December 12, 2003

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?lang=da&id=266&mode=g&name

Civilian crisis management

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?lang=en&id=278&mode=g&name=

Action Plan for Civilian Aspects of European Security and Defence Policy (ESP.) can be found at the bottom of this page with other documents and links:

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?lang=en&id=278&mode=g&name

Documents establishing the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?lang=en&id=279&mode=g&name

Introduction to the Common Foreign and Security Policy

<http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r00001.htm>

ECAP -European Capabilities Action Plan

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=437&lang=da&mode=g

EU Operations around the world

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=da&mode=g

The European Defence Agency

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=277&lang=da&mode=g

Statement by the Franco-German Defence & Security Council, April 2005

http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2005/franco_germany_defense042605.asp

Evolution of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) NATO/EU

<http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0401.htm>

EU Institute for Security Studies, ISS-EU

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?lang=en&id=280&mode=g&name

EU-NATO Cooperation

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?lang=en&id=282&mode=g&name

European Commission check-list for root causes of conflict

http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/cfsp/cpcm/cp/list.htm

Communication from the Commission to the European Council, The European Parliament, etc
European Defence-Industrial and Market Issues. Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy

http://66.102.9.104/search?q=cache:VAIFGqnF4twJ:europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2003/com2003_0113en01.pdf+european+defence+industry&hl=sv&start=2.

Websites

A small selection of EU-independent sites offering other backgrounds, news and lots of debate materials.

The EU Observer

<http://www.euobserver.com>

EurActiv.com

<http://www.euractiv.com>

StateWatch

<http://www.statewatch.org>

The Transnational Foundation's EU Conflict Management Forum

http://www.transnational.org/forum/meet/2001/EU_militarization_index.html

Europe 2020

<http://www.europe2020.org/en/home.htm>

The Defence System Daily

<http://defence-data.com/ripley/pagerip1.htm>

About Jan Oberg

Born 1951 in Denmark, PhD in sociology, peace and future researcher. He is co-founder and director of the TFF - the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research – in Lund, Sweden.

Øberg is associated with several international institutes and universities and has published around 3.600 pages of academic literature. He is the author or co-author of some twenty books and hundreds of articles. His main books, mostly in Nordic languages, are *Myth about Our Security*, *To Develop Security and Secure Development*, *Winning Peace* (with Dietrich Fischer and Wilhelm Nolte). In 2004 he published *Predictable Fiasco. The Conflict with Iraq and Denmark as an Occupying Power*. In 2005 he contributed to a Danish textbook in psychology with a chapter on peace and conflict psychology and co-authored *The Psychology of Evil*.

Øberg who is listed in *Marquis Who's Who?* And holds an honorary doctoral degree from the Buddhist Soka University in Tokyo. He has received a few international peace prizes, is also a frequent public lecturer and contributor to the debate about international affairs in Nordic and European media.

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TFF – The Transnational Foundation
www.transnational.org

See also

TFF EU Conflict Management Forum

Foreign and security policy, militarization and the alternatives since 2001

http://www.transnational.org/forum/meet/2001/EU_militarization_index.html

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About the Danish think-tank NewAgenda

NewAgenda - NyAgenda - was founded in 2005. The aim of the think-tank is to initiate investigations and debates on the development of European co-operation seen from a critical democratic and citizen perspective. Of special concern to the think-tank is the role of European Union in the world and especially in relation to the Global South.

Through in-depth analyses, NewAgenda shall contribute to the debate in Denmark and internationally on contemporary social change, seen from a centre-left perspective. Through its investigations and encouragement of public debates, the think-tank shall contribute to challenging conformism and established ways of thinking.

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Publications in Danish:

2005:1. *Franske stemmer. Kritik af forfatningsforslaget fra venstre (Voices from France. Critique of the Proposal for a new EU Constitution)*. Contributions by Etienne Chouard, Bernard Cassen, Anne-Cécilie Robert, Raoul Marc Jenanr et al. Ed. by Drude Dahlerup, Kenneth Haar and Niels I. Meyer.

2005:2. **Fremmer EU freden? Analyse, kritik og alternativer (Does the European Union Promote Peace? Analysis, critique and alternatives)**. By Jan Øberg.

2005:3 *Under bekvemmelighedsflag. Konsekvenserne af EUs servicedirektiv (Under Flag of Convenience. The Consequences of EU's Service Directive)*. By Kenneth Haar.

2006:1 *"Vore globale handelsinteresser" ("Our Global Trade Interests")*. Ed. By Kenneth Haar. Contributions among others by Christina Deckwirth.

Does the European Union Promote Peace?

Analysis, critique and alternatives

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Does the European Union Promote Peace?

It is common to characterize the European Union as a peace project, but what is in fact meant by peace within EU circles?

In this report, the Danish/Swedish peace- and conflict researcher, Jan Øberg analyses EU's policies on defence, security, foreign policy, conflict management and peace. The general principles of the proposed EU Constitution, rejected by the French and Dutch voters, are also scrutinized.

The report shows that the understanding of 'peace' in the proposed Constitution as well as in other central EU documents is heavily influenced by a traditional military-based notion of defence and security. According to this understanding, there exists a 'good' violence that must balance or eliminate 'bad' violence. In contrast, very little is stated about civilian policies and conflict management. The many types of violence in- and outside Europe doesn't appear as a problem.

Jan Øberg discusses two alternative approaches of peace, seen in relation to four dimensions: direct violence, structural violence, cultural violence, and environmental violence. The report presents 25 constructive proposals which, if implemented, would make EU a much more genuine actor for peace which could challenge the militarist policies of the United States in a positive manner.

While the word 'peace' only appears eight times in the proposed Constitution, and conflict prevention only five times, defence/defence policy is mentioned 64 times and the military/combat forces 21 times. Reconciliation, disarmament and control of the arms trade are issues not mentioned and not present on EU's agenda at all, neither do the documents mention that EU is nuclear-based.

Irrespective of the fate of the Constitution, increased armament and militarization are destined to be key elements in EU policies. This is the more worrying since, as the report reveals, the European Union has neither a coherent analysis of future threats nor a credible European security doctrine.

In summary, the European Union and its Constitution is far less consistent and visionary in its peace policies than the United Nations and its Charter.

www.nyagenda.dk

The Danish think-tank NewAgenda